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International organizations (1Os) form law-making alliances to
achieve instrumental goals and enhance the legitimacy of their work
product. For example, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the World Bank joined forces to promote a
legislative guide for modernizing national bankruptcy statutes.' The
World Trade Organization (WTO) has incorporated the standards set by
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (for food safety), the International
Office of Epizootics (for animal health), and the International Plant Pro-
tection Convention (for plant health) into its Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).2 The World Bank has incorporated into
its Loan Guidelines the United Nations Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural
and Natural Heritage, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
Guidelines for Packaging and Storage of Pesticides.' The legitimacy
claims of these alliances and the norms that they generate are derivative;
they flow from the legitimacy claims made by the constituent organiza-
tions of the alliance and from the act of allying. I believe that the best
method to assess the legitimacy of the resulting norms is to examine
whether the alliance employs good procedures.
Legitimacy claims are increasingly important to 1Os because they
permit the 1Os to: (i) answer concerns regarding accountability and in-
clusiveness that arise as democratic norms spread among the
constituencies that IOs affect; and (ii) secure compliance with the norms
that they generate. 1Os address difficult problems and often compete
with each other to address these problems. These 1Os face criticisms
1. See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking
12 (Fordham L. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 952492, 2006), available at http:II
ssrn.comlabstract=952492 [hereinafter Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation].
2. Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 4, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex A, para. 3, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
3. Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 237 (2006)
[hereinafter ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS].
4. See Laurence Heifer, Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, 37
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 193, 211-12 (2003) (discussing "overlapping competencies" among inter-
national institutions); Laurence R. Heifer, Understanding Change in International
Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO, 59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 693 (2006)
[hereinafter Heifer, Understanding Change] (explaining how the International Labour Organi-
sation (ILO) "experienced new forms of competition from other international bodies, in
particular from the human rights activities of the United Nations Economic and Social Coun-
cil"); Joel P. Trachtman, The Boundaries of the WTO: Institutional Linkage: Transcending
"Trade and...", 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (2002).
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that they are unrepresentative or nondemocratic at a time when democ-
ratic values are on the rise.5 Thus, it is not surprising that they
increasingly employ the tools of linkage and accommodation and turn to
other lOs to form alliances in which they collaborate, share resources, or
broker consensus. These alliances bring within their ambit more experts,
more nuanced problem-solving techniques, more resources, and estab-
lish a new basis for law-making legitimacy, i.e., derivative legitimacy.
These alliances thus force us to consider what framework works best
to assess derivative legitimacy.6 lOs seeking to promulgate or propagate
legal norms have always faced legitimacy questions: By what authority
do they purport to act?7 To whom are they accountable? What power do
they have to enforce their commands?" Why should anybody listen?9
These questions challenge an 1O to justify its structure and conduct. One
could characterize these questions as directed toward an 10's primary
legitimacy claims. These questions are more complex when addressed to
alliances that claim legitimacy from a combination of sources and thus
challenge derivative legitimacy claims.
To answer these questions we must first define what we mean by
legitimacy. 10 legitimacy claims are complex and distinct from inquir-
ies involving domestic entities.'0 As Ian Hurd explains, legitimacy of
lOs should be understood from a relational perspective." Legitimacy
results when one party-e.g., a State-in relation to another-e.g., an
10-perceives that other party as legitimate.' 2 As Hurd explains, this
5. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Between Centralization and Fragmenta-
tion: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy 9-
10 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWPO1-004, 2001),
available at http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP0I-004/$File/rwpOl
004_nye_revi.pdf (discussing the spread of democratic norms and criticisms of international
organizations (lOs) as undemocratic).
6. Id. at 16 (calling for a new system to assess global governance).
7. Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative
Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64 (2005) (discussing the accountability of lOs).
8. THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990)
(discussing legitimacy as a means to secure compliance).
9. See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View
From Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 15-16 (2006) (discussing the legitimacy challenge to IOs
generally).
10. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 3; see also G.C.A. Junne, International Organiza-
tions in a Period of Globalization: New (Problems o3 Legitimacy, in THE LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 189 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
11. IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL 7 (2007) [hereinafter HURD, AFTER ANARCHY]; Ian Hurd, Legitimacy,
Power and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 35, 35-38
(2002) [hereinafter Hurd, Legitimacy].
12. Hurd, Legitimacy, supra note 11, at 38 (noting that "[p]erceptions of legitimacy
create the authoritative instructions").
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perception is subjective," but it responds to a legitimacy claim that can
be assessed using objective criteria. To help concretize and systematize
this relational analysis of legitimacy, it is helpful to divide legitimacy
claims into two broad categories: input legitimacy and output legitimacy.
Output legitimacy focuses on the ends of decision-making and asks
whether the resulting laws or proposed laws are effective under a par-
ticular normative standard. 4 Input legitimacy focuses on the means of
lawmaking and asks whether the resulting laws come from democratic,
representative, or procedurally fair processes.' 5 It is difficult for lOs to
satisfy both output criteria and input criteria at the same time. 6 This Ar-
ticle considers whether derivative legitimacy is best assessed using an
input metric, an output metric, or some combination of the two.
Part I describes global lawmaking and the legitimacy challenge. It
provides a typology of lOs that develop norms: (i) regulatory bodies,
(ii) governmental norm-creating forums, and (iii) private norm-creating
forums. It explains that legitimacy is a subjective belief, but it provides
objective paradigms for assessing legitimacy claims. It demonstrates
how pursuing legitimacy according to one set of criteria can sacrifice
legitimacy claims under another. It also examines the competition among
1Os, the push for democratic norms, and the resulting need for stronger
legitimacy claims.
Part II explains linkage and accommodation and gives specific ex-
amples of where these phenomena work to garner more legitimacy for
specific organizations and the soft and hard law that they develop. 7
Linkage and accommodation techniques result in at least four types of
alliances: partnering, coordination, endorsements, and resource-sharing
arrangements. Each of these alliances enables claims of derivative le-
gitimacy.
Part III outlines some of the positive and negative consequences of
derivative legitimacy, including stronger legitimacy claims, marginaliza-
tion of interests, entrenchment, new regime and forum shifting
13. HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 11, at 7.
14. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 12-16. This normative standard is typically set by
the organization itself. An alternative approach would be to assess the normative legitimacy
more generally and to question why it is that a global governance institution has the right to
rule. Output legitimacy, or effectiveness, would be only one part of that inquiry and would
involve a moral assessment of the institution. See Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The
Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 405, 412 (2006).
15. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 12-15.
16. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 2 (noting the paradox).
17. For a definition of soft law and hard law, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal,
Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 421-22 (2000). Abbott
and Snidal define hard law as precise, legally binding obligations that delegate authority for
interpreting and implementing the law, while defining soft law as somewhat weakened in its
obligations, precision, or delegation. Id.
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opportunities, and unique opportunities for abuse that these alliances
create.
Finally, Part IV argues that a derivative legitimacy analysis must fo-
cus on the relationship among the constituent 1Os, and that the best
paradigm to do so is a process-based paradigm. We should consider
whether these alliances have sufficient procedures to secure transpar-
ency, participation, and fairness. Although the particular processes will
depend on the type of alliance, some standard procedural devices, such
as notice, transparency mechanisms, power-sharing devices, rules requir-
ing explanation, and rules against corruption, will be important to
promote stronger legitimacy claims and mitigate the negative conse-
quences of these alliances.
I. THE LEGITIMACY CHALLENGE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. International Organizations as Institutions
for Global Lawmaking
The institutions of global governance form a complex and overlap-
ping web of problem-solving entities that touch on almost every aspect
of life." In this Article, I use the term international organization (10)
broadly to refer to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)' 9 (as embod-
ied in some institutions, such as the WTO or UNCITRAL) and private
international governance institutions (such as the International Chamber
of Commerce (ICC)). 2° I divide the relevant lOs by how they generate
legal norms: (i) regulatory bodies, (ii) quasi-governmental norm-
generating forums, and (iii) private norm-generating forums.
Regulatory Bodies. Regulatory bodies are institutions established by
States that have the power to generate norms and rules to which States
have ex ante committed. These lOs derive their authority from the
membership of sovereign States." States are drawn to regulatory IOs;22
18. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 14, at 406.
19. For a description of IGOs, see MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 7-10
(2004).
20. Id. at 14. One could also analyze ad hoc arrangements (such as the Group of 7), or
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Including these govern-
ment networks in the analysis is possible, but, for simplicity's sake, I will leave that task to
another day. For a thorough description of government networks and the implications that they
have for global governance, see ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
21. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 19, at 8-10.
22. Id.
Summer 2008]
Michigan Journal of International Law
1Os have efficiencies that make membership appealing.23 Additionally,
both developing and developed nations see membership in regulatory
bodies as enhancing their standing in the community of nations. 4
Membership in some organizations, such as the WTO, has become a
must, given the economic benefits that accrue to members.25
Quasi Governmental Norm-Creating Forums. Other 1Os generate
norms to which States will agree ex post. For example, UNCITRAL is an
arm of the United Nations, from which it derives its authority.26
UNCITRAL's work product includes conventions, model laws, and leg-
islative guides. Likewise, the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is a law-making forum in which Member
States that have acceded to the UNIDROIT statute work on harmonizing
substantive private law issues.28 It focuses on technical (and less politi-
cal) issues.29 Its work product includes conventions, principles, uniform
laws, and guides. ° There are other governmental law-generating forums
that address other issue areas."
23. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 4-5 (1998).
24. Developing nations may seek membership in 1Os in order to affect domestic poli-
cies. Edward D. Mansfield & Jon C. Pevehouse, Democratization and International
Organizations, 60 INT'L ORG. 137, 138-39 (2006). For example, 10 membership helps leaders
to sustain domestic democratic reforms. Id. at 161. Mansfield and Pevehouse note that democ-
ratizing countries may find that membership in lOs can positively or negatively affect their
reputation and the credibility of their leaders, depending on their actions within the organiza-
tion. Id. at 141, 144, 161; see also Robert Howse, The Legitimacy of the World Trade
Organization, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, at
355, 356 (discussing how "[s]overeigns use international organizations as a means of legiti-
mizing their own power," but questioning who, in turn, legitimizes the 10).
25. See Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 545,
580-81 (2004) [hereinafter Kelly, Realist Theory].
26. Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, G.A.
Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1497th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/6396 (Dec. 17,
1966).
27. THE UNCITRAL GUIDE: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, at 45-48, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.12 (2007) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL GUIDE].
28. See Statute of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law art. 1,
Mar. 14, 1940, 15 U.S.T. 2494; see also UNIDROIT: An Overview, http://www.unidroit.org/
english/presentation/main.htm (last visited May 4, 2008).
29. Structure, Legislative Policy, and Working Methods of UNIDROIT, http://
www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/main.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2008) (noting that
"UNIDROIT's independent status amongst intergovernmental Organisations has enabled it to
pursue working methods which have made it a particularly suitable forum for tackling more
technical and correspondingly less political issues").
30. Id.
31. The Hague Conference on Private International Law includes sixty-seven Member
States that work toward the "progressive unification of the rules of private international law."
Statute on the Hague Conference on Private International Law art. 1, Oct. 9-31, 1951, 15
U.S.T. 2228, 220 U.N.T.S. 121, available at http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=
[Vol. 29:605
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Private Norm-Creating Forums. International, private norm-creating
forums work in much the same way as private legislatures in the domes-
tic setting; they generate rules or standards that parties choose to adopt if
those parties think that the rules or standards will be useful. 32 For exam-
ple, the ICC sets standards that will facilitate business, should businesses
choose to adopt them.33 Among its most notable successes are the Uni-
form Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP 500 and UCP
600), which banks routinely adopt to govern their letters of credit, and
ICC INCOTERMS, which parties frequently adopt as a matter of course
when engaging in the sale of goods.34
Regulatory lOs and, to a lesser degree, governmental and private
norm-creating forums, compete with each other for members, jurisdic-
tion, and relevancy.3" Although one could contend that an 10 has no
independent persona beyond its constituents, one can see examples of
lOs reaching beyond the original mandates established by their constitu-
ents to: (i) expand their jurisdiction, (ii) change their agendas in response
to changed circumstances, and (iii) remain relevant.36 For example, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/WTO expanded its role from a
body primarily aimed at tariff reduction and enforcing rules of nondis-
crimination to a body that, in some instances, promoted substantive
conventions.text&cid=29. None of these bodies are legislatures or law-creating bodies; rather,
they are institutions that develop rules and make policy choices that only become law once
States choose to adopt them. States may coordinate their efforts among these governmental
forums. Another law-generating forum is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. See
About the Basel Committee, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
For a description of the Basel Committee, see David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and
Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005); see also Barr & Miller,
supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the Basel process design).
32. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legis-
latures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (examining "large private law making groups").
33. International Chamber of Commerce [ICC] Constitution art. 1, available at http://
www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/ICCHome-Page/pages/Constitution8101907E.pdf (last
visited Aug. 9, 2008).
34. See generally Henry Gabriel, International Chamber of Commerce Incoterms 2000:
A Guide to Their Terms and Usage, 5 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COMM. L. & ARB. (2001). Like the
ICC, the Institute of International Banking Law and Practice (IIBLP) has developed rules
governing letters of credit that private parties can voluntarily adopt to govern their transac-
tions. IIBLP, Institute of International Banking Law & Practice, http://www.iiblp.org (last
visited Sept. 11, 2008). Another example of a private norm-creating institution is the Comit6
Maritime International, which promotes the unification of maritime law. CMI, http://
www.comitemaitime.org/ratific/ratitle.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2008). Still another example
is the International Standards Organization. ISO Standards: Info Guide to ISO, http:I/
www.isostandards101.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2008).
35. Heifer, Understanding Change, supra note 4, at 693.
36. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1492, 1605-07 (discussing the phenomenon of "mission creep" in lOs and citing as an
example the expanding mandate of the WTO).
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harmonization. In a related vein, Laurence Heifer has explored the In-
ternational Labor Organization's (ILO) ongoing evolution over its
ninety-year history, including the competition it faced from other institu-
tions, such as the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC).38 Whether these changes are the result of an institutional
persona, or merely the result of nation-state desires, as 1Os change they
often compete with other 1Os for jurisdiction over important issues.3 9 1s
pursue legitimacy because it helps them to compete, change, and remain
relevant. 4°
B. The Legitimacy Problem
To evaluate an 1O's legitimacy claims, we must define legitimacy. As
Hurd explains, legitimacy is "an actor's normative belief that a rule or
institution ought to be obeyed. 4' It is intersubjective.42 1Os have legiti-
macy when other actors believe they do.43 As a result, one cannot truly
hope to assess an 10's legitimacy.4 Rather, at best, one can hope only to
assess an 1O's legitimacy claim to ascertain whether States will likely
perceive the 10 and its work product as legitimate.
37. Arie Reich, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 362 (2004).
38. See Heifer, Understanding Change, supra note 4, at 693.
39. Laurence R. Helfer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellec-
tual Property Regime, 36 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 123, 134-35 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer,
Mediating]. UNCITRAL sets its working agenda in part in response to the prevailing com-
mercial law needs. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 10. The ICC has adopted the ISP 98,
promulgated by the IIBLP. See International Standby Practices: ISP98, ICC Publication No.
590 (1998).
40. Hurd, Legitimacy, supra note 11, at 35-36 (noting that "[t]he power of social insti-
tutions in a society is largely a function of the legitimacy of those institutions").
41. HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 11, at 7. Alternatively, one could question the
normative prescription more generally. See Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 14, at 412.
Buchanan and Keohane reject the three traditional standards to judge the normative question,
i.e., state consent, consent by democratic States, and global democracy, in favor of a more
complex inquiry that mixes consent, justice democracy, morality, fairness, and procedure. Id.
at 417-18.
42. HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 11, at 7-8. Naturally, when one considers the
relational quality of legitimacy, one must identify the parties. Whose subjective belief mat-
ters-States, citizens, or other IOs? Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 7 (describing legitimacy as a subjective quality "defined by the actor's per-
ception of the institution").
44. Id. at 8 (characterizing legitimacy as a "difficult concept to study ... [which] is not
readily accessible to outside observers").
45. Id. at 31 (noting that since legitimacy is not accessible by outside observers, it can
only be measured "through an assessment of whether the audience in question acknowledges
it").
[Vol. 29:605
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1Os' legitimacy claims can be assessed by reference to their
institutional functioning or to institutional accomplishments. This
distinction has been drawn by Fritz Scharpf, and later by Robert
Keohane and Joseph Nye. They describe these lenses as input and output
legitimacy, or input and output criteria.47 Input legitimacy captures those
legitimacy claims that focus on the means by which constituents
participate in 1Os, e.g., representation, inclusiveness, or process. Output
legitimacy represents those paradigms that focus on substantive
outcomes, e.g., trade liberalization or fairness, and whether goals set by
the lOs themselves are reached, i.e., the efficacy of the 10.48 Not
surprisingly, lOs seek both input and output legitimacy, even though the
46. Josd E. Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
324, 332 (2006) [hereinafter Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now] (discussing
universal legitimacy in the context of customary international law); Daniel C. Esty, Good
Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490,
1495-96, 1515 (2006) (articulating a "taxonomy of legitimacy" consisting of "democratic,
results-based, order-derived, systemic, deliberative, and procedural" values, seeing administra-
tive law at the heart of legitimacy); Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the
Legitimacy of Power: International Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 88, 93 (2006). The lack of an international demos has made a "domestic analogy" less help-
ful than one might initially think. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at II (describing the lack of a
political community and referring to Hedley Bull). Keohane and Nye discuss alternatives to
voting that might be used to increase international democratic accountability, namely increas-
ing domestic accountability and "legislative control over policy at the supra-national level."
Id. at 13.
47. FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 2 (1999)
(defining input legitimacy as government "by the people," and output as "government for the
people"). These labels are merely guides that I adopt for purposes of discussion rather than
definitive categories. Thoughtful scholars have articulated other useful ways of approaching
the legitimacy question. Thomas Franck famously categorized three ways to approach legiti-
macy: through process, through substance and process, and through outcomes, most
specifically fairness. FRANCK, supra note 8, at 16-18. Joseph Weiler distinguishes formal
legitimacy-legitimacy from following legal requirements-from social legitimacy-
legitimacy stemming from general societal acquiescence. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation
of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2468-69 (1991). Peter Gerhart structures an analysis that
inquires as to whether an institution fosters foundational goals of democracy, constitutional-
ism, and sovereignty. Peter M. Gerhart, The Two Constitutional Visions of the World Trade
Organization, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 1, 9 (2003); see also Junne, supra note 10, at 191
(identifying justice, procedure, representation, effectiveness, and charisma as sources of le-
gitimacy). Meanwhile, Nathaniel Berman proposes a theory of legitimacy through defiance.
Nathaniel Berman, Legitimacy Through Defiance: From Goa to Iraq, 23 Wis. INT'L L.J. 93
(2005); see also Nathaniel Berman, Intervention in a "Divided World": Axes of Legitimacy, 17
EUR. J. INT'L L. 743 (2006) (focusing on interventions and arguing for a more fluid legitimacy
analysis). These approaches are all helpful, and one can readily see overlap with the categories
that I adopt.
48. Esty, supra note 46, at 1517.
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pursuit of legitimacy through one set of criteria may undermine or forfeit
legitimacy through another. 9
1. Input Legitimacy
Representation. 1Os enhance their legitimacy claims by developing
norms in a representative manner. For example, the ILO is a representa-
tive body that has evolved over time.0 Its members include States that
send delegates representing different constituencies, including worker
and employer delegates." Where 1Os work in a representative or democ-
ratic fashion, their norms reflect the will of the entities on whose behalf
they act; they represent and are accountable to their constituents. 5
Whether an 10 is truly accountable depends on its relationship with
its constituents.53 That relationship can be strained by a variety of factors.
The constituents can be numerous, with diverse and sometimes conflict-
ing interests. Even the interests of discrete groups will change over
time.5 It is not always clear that the groups representing various interests
are themselves governed by democratic norms.56 Both States and 1Os
49. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 45-46; Keohane & Nye,
supra note 5, at 8 (quoting Harlan Cleveland as asking, "How do you get everyone into the
action, and still get action?").
50. Helfer, Understanding Change, supra note 4, at 693 (reporting that ILO member-
ship includes 179 States, the delegations of which are representative); International Labour
Organisation Constitution art. 3, para. 5, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/
iloconst.htm (last visited May 5, 2008) [hereinafter 1LO Constitution]; ILO Constitution, su-
pra, arts. 1-3, 7.
51. ILO Constitution, supra note 50, arts. 1-3, 7.
52. Esty, supra note 46, at 1507 (discussing accountability). Esty explains that "democ-
ratic legitimacy depends on decision-makers being seen as acting on behalf of a community."
Id. at 1504.
53. Id. at 1505 ("The legitimacy of decisionmaking becomes more strained as the sense
of community thins and the distance between those exercising authority and the public
grows."); see also Paul B. Stephen, The New International Law-Legitimacy, Accountability,
Authority and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1578 (1999).
54. Junne, supra note 10, at 192 (discussing global society).
55. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Evangelicals Sway White House on Human Rights
Issues Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, at 11, available at http://www.commondreams.org/
headlines03/1026-08.htm ("The religious dynamic at the White House reflects a larger change
within American evangelicals themselves, and their interest over the last decade in moving
beyond the divisive domestic issues that consumed them a generation ago-abortion, school
prayer, homosexuality, pornography-into an international arena."); see also Luther L.
McDougal Ill, Codification of Choice of Law: A Critique of the Recent European Trend, 55
TUL. L. REv. 114, 133 (1980) (discussing changing state interests and choice of law analysis).
56. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 14. On the state level, many countries operate
under dictatorial regimes and still participate in lOs-from King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz
Al Saud's Saudi Arabia (a Member State of the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) to Hu Jintao's China (a permanent member
of the U.N. Security Council and member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, and the WTO). On the organizational level, see Michael T. Hayes, The
New Group Universe, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 142 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett Loomis eds.,
[Vol. 29:605
Institutional Alliances & Derivative Legitimacy
may be undemocratic or unrepresentative. 7 And as 10s achieve greater
integration, more questions concerning their law-making legitimacy
arise."
Inclusion. Scholars have documented the organizational structure of
UNCITRAL as an inclusive body. 9 UNCITRAL employs working
groups in specific issue areas.' UNCITRAL seeks representativeness by
constituting these groups with a broad base, including: official state
delegations from a worldwide geographic and economic cross section
equaling sixty States, observer States (all States are invited), and other
Its.61
Inclusion as the basis for a legitimacy claim is a close cousin to rep-
resentation, but there are some differences between the two. Inclusion,
like representation, provides accountability. 62 However, inclusion in-
volves participation of non-electoral bodies. One might want to include
the views of experts or of civil society, for example.6 Thus, 1ts garner
legitimacy through tactics of inclusion targeting States, citizens, NGOs,
and other lOs.
Broad-based state membership does not necessarily equate with in-
put legitimacy from either a representation or inclusion perspective. The
WTO has near universal membership, and yet has been characterized
under the "club model," in which only a limited number of States enjoy
meaningful representation with respect to agenda setting. 6' As discussed
1986) (stating that "[a]t a minimum, the policy views of group leaders often will diverge from
those of their members"); see also Terry M. Moe, Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups,
43 J. POL. 531 (1981); Paul A. Sabatier, Interest Group Membership and Organization: Multi-
ple Theories, in THE POLITICS OF INTERESTS 106 (Mark P. Petracca ed., 1992) (citing Terry M.
Moe, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS (1980)).
57. See Junne, supra note 10, at 192-93 (discussing the United Nations and observing
that even where an 10 provides for one State, one vote, powerful nations can exert themselves
over weaker States).
58. Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95
Am. J. INT'L L. 489, 530 (2001) (confirming the "correlation between the level of integration
(normative-institutional and empirical-social), on the one hand, and the intensity of the dis-
course on the democracy legitimacy deficit, on the other").
59. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 14, 72 (discussing inclusive-
ness).
60. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 29-47.
61. Id. at 2-4.
62. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 12.
63. Id. at 14 (discussing participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
professional, and transnational networks, as well as markets).
64. Id. at 13.
65. See James Thou Gathii, The High Stakes of WTO Reform, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1361,
1362 (2006) (citing Keohane & Nye, supra note 5). The club model refers to institutions in
which outsiders--those not involved with the issue area or the public generally-are not
included in the work of the institution. Thus, for example, only trade ministers may do the
work of the WTO. A club can have limited and restricted membership or be open to all. See
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more fully below, Keohane and Nye's club model describes institutions
that exclude outsiders-outsiders being those deemed "not concerned"
with the particular issue area, e.g., only trade ministers are included in
the "trade" club.66 But, the club model has also come to refer to institu-
tions run by a small, discrete, homogenous group, typically from
wealthy governments that limit transparency and participation.67
Process. 10 norms, rules, and standards can claim legitimacy be-
cause they result from fair procedures, deliberations, or discourse.
Process imposes transparency, participation, and dialogue on institutions.
Some process tools focus on the discourse among decision-makers or
68stakeholders as promoting fair and effective conduct. Among the proc-
ess tools that promote legitimacy are rules for sound rulemaking,69
transparency rules,7 ° public participation mechanisms,7 ' controls against
corruption, 2 and power-sharing devices.73
1Os strengthen legitimacy claims by adopting good procedures.
Some call for 1Os to adopt better procedures generally.74 Recent scholar-
ship, in particular the Global Administrative Law Project, has examined
the use of various "administrative law" mechanisms in global lawmak-
ing.75 Few lOs adopt all of the available processes, but many 1Os adopt
some. The International Civil Aviation Organization's procedures for
developing Standards and Recommended Practices involve a process that
could be characterized as a type of notice and comment rulemaking.76
Recently, the World Bank sought comments on its anticorruption initia-
tive, Strengthening Bank Group Engagement on Governance and
generally Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 2 (explaining how governance regimes "operated
as clubs of negotiators").
66. Id. at 4.
67. Janet K. Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 131 (2005).
68. Esty, supra note 46, at 1520-21.
69. Id. at 1527-30.
70. Id. at 1530-34; Stephen, supra note 53, at 1580.
71. Esty, supra note 46, at 1530-34; Stephen, supra note 53, at 1580.
72. Esty, supra note 46, at 1524-26.
73. Id. at 1534-37.
74. Stewart, supra note 7, at 64 (discussing accountability of lOs).
75. GAL Symposium, 37 N.Y.U. J. INTr'L L. & POL. (2005); GAL Home, http://iilj.org/
GAL (last visited Sept. 10, 2008); see also Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 16-18.
76. See International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO], Making an ICAO Standard,
http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto-m.pl?icao/en/anb/mais/index.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2008);
see also Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction, Global Governance and Global
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1,4 (2006) (discuss-
ing administrative law trends, specifically, notice and comment procedures adopted by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank).
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Anticorruption. The International Atomic Energy Agency generally
holds open meetings and allows other international organizations ob-
server status." Likewise, the International Hydrographic Organization,
which develops standards for navigational products, opens its proceed-
ings to other 1Os or national agencies, and has procedures for submitting
issues to the general body.79
Input legitimacy, whether it takes the form of representation,
inclusion, or process, has its deficiencies. Representation does not
necessarily equate to democracy.8° Although democracy is not an
essential requirement of input legitimacy, commentators sometimes
focus on democratic deficits among 1Os.' Unfortunately, the democratic
paradigm simply does not translate to the international setting.82 Even
where one requires only some form of representation or inclusion, as
opposed to democratic representation, representative institutions do not
necessarily represent all interests equally.3 Interests change, and some
constituents have more voice than others. 4 Purportedly democratic or
representative lOs are subject to capture by special interests. 85
77. World Bank, Invitation to Comment: Bank Group Work in Governance and Anticor-
ruption, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/comments/govemancefeedback (last visited
May 5, 2008).
78. See International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Rules of Procedure of the Gen-
eral Conference, § 5, R. 32 (Sept. 29, 1989), available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/
GC/gcrules.html#item5.
79. International Hydrographic Organization [IHO], General Regulations of the IHO,
arts. 6, 9 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.iho.shom.fr/GENINFO/GENERAL_
REGSE.pdf. Interpol requires staff members to "abstain from any action which might be
prejudicial to their international task." INT'L CRIM. POLICE ORG.-INTERPOL CONST.
art. 30, available at http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/
constitutionGenReg/constitution.asp. Most major lOs have some code of ethics. See, e.g.,
JOAN S. POWERS, OVERVIEW OF THE RULES ON CONDUCT AND ETHICS AT THE IMF, available
at http://www.imf.org/externallnp/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/powers.pdf (last visited Aug. 15,
2008); Press Release, World Health Org., Director-General Implements New Code of Conduct
for Financial Disclosure, WHO/55 (July 21, 1998), available at http://www.who.int/inf-pr-
1998/en/pr98-55.html.
80. Esty, supra note 46, at 1532 ("In the supranational governance context, the ability
to participate in a meaningful way in policymaking is not evenly distributed across countries
or even across interests within nations.").
81. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15, 18 (describing
the "global administrative law" project); Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Global Governance Organi-
zations: Legitimacy and Authority in Conflict, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 177 (2008)
(noting the criticism).
82. Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 14, at 416; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at I I-
15.
83. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
85. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 3, at
245-46 (comparing international lawmaking to national administrative law systems); Krisch
& Kingsbury, supra note 76, at 4 (discussing capture).
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Institutions that claim only to be inclusive are subject to the criticism
that inclusion does not equal representation 6 Also, institutions that do
seek legitimacy through representation or inclusion may find it difficult
to get things done.17 For example, law-generating forums that seek
consensus on model instruments may find those instruments unadopted."
Thus, representation or inclusion can undermine effectiveness.89
Process can undermine effectiveness as well. Some processes im-
pose difficult political costs on States.90 Transparency, for example, may
generally be a healthy attribute for an 1O, but it may also cause domestic
repercussions for Member States of that organization.9' Moreover, while
one can hope that procedurally fair institutions will, as a result of these
attributes, generate useful and fair norms, none of these attributes assures
a substantively fair or just law or any law at all.92 Additionally, process
can slow progress. 93 For example, notice and comment rulemaking ide-
ally leads to dialogue that leads to better rules,94 but it also takes time and
has costs.95 There are numerous examples of rulemaking in the United
96States that have spanned years and sometimes decades. Process can be
86. Stewart, supra note 7, at 71 (discussing substantive criticisms of the international
regulatory process as "dominated by well-organized economic interests and powerful coun-
tries").
87. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 8.
88. See infra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
89. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 17 (using the WTO to illustrate that increased
participation "by groups threatened by losses" relating to certain negotiations may "foster
deadlock").
90. Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 76, at 8.
91. Id.
92. See Zaring, supra note 31, at 580 (referring specifically to the Basel Committee, "it
is difficult to draw normatively rich conclusions about the substantive outcomes of proce-
durally legitimate decisions").
93. Stewart, supra note 7, at 81 (discussing the rationale of the parity minus approach,
"excessive legalization and procedural formality will compromise confidentiality in interna-
tional negotiations and otherwise impair the ability of the executive to conclude and promptly
implement international agreements").
94. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 705 F.2d
506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that notice and comment improve agency rulemaking by
putting rules to the test of public commentary); Am. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d
525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that notice and comment requirements "infuse[] the admin-
istrative process with [a] degree of openness, explanation, and participatory democracy");
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that comments educate the
agency before rules with substantial impact are enacted).
95. Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delibera-
tive Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173, 217-48 (1997) ("Excessive participation
interferes with ordinary decisions in at least three respects: by interfering with agenda setting
by politically accountable agency decisionmakers, by causing information problems for deci-
sionmakers and participants, and by impairing collegiality among decisionmakers.").
96. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (chronicling the fifteen-year ordeal of seatbelt and passive restraint rulemaking).
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abused.97 Special interests can delay and obfuscate by using process."
Analytical requirements and review of rulemaking can lead to ossifica-
tion.99
2. Output Legitimacy
Alternatively, 1Os can claim legitimacy to develop norms based on
their accomplishments. Results-based, or output, legitimacy focuses on
good outcomes.1°° Assessing what is a "good" outcome requires a norma-
tive position and might include determining whether a law, standard, or
rule is fair, just, well ordered, universally accepted, or supportive of a
particular goal, e.g., trade liberalization. In short, output legitimacy ques-
tions whether the 10 is effective at generating useful norms and having
them implemented.' °' While compliance is not the sole basis for output
criteria, assessing output criteria can be a bit circular because legitimacy
aids compliance. Parties are more likely to comply with norms they per-
ceive as legitimate. Thus, the perception of legitimacy leads to greater
compliance (effectiveness), and in turn stronger legitimacy claims. Ef-
fectiveness also involves developing useful norms in the first place.' 2
Effectiveness in developing norms can result from lOs' expertise or a
limited constituency with convergent interests and/or limited focus and
mandate."3 Effective norm development may also be fostered by inclu-
sion, process, deliberation, and discourse, or any of the attributes that
97. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-96 (1992) (discussing ossification); Lars Noah, Sham Petitioning as
a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1, 3-48 (1995) (noting
that "real opportunities exist for sham petitioning in administrative proceedings").
98. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169-70 (1990) (explaining
capture theory as viewing politicians and bureaucrats as susceptible to incentives offered by
individual interests or firms). In one example, the cigarette industry was able to insinuate its
representatives into the WHO process for its Framework Convention on Tobacco, leading to
claims that the process had been abused. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
99. McGarity, supra note 97, at 1385-96.
100. Esty, supra note 46, at 1517 (discussing the nature of results-based legitimacy as
being focused on generating social welfare gains). One can also claim legitimacy stemming
from one's work product as effective, neutral, or expert (e.g., output legitimacy, neutral, or
communal legitimacy). See Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, supra note
46, at 332 (discussing legitimacy and customary international law).
101. Robert 0. Keohane, Decisiveness and Accountability as Part of a Principled Re-
sponse to Nonstate Threats, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFi. 219, 229 (2006).
102. Robert 0. Keohane, The Contingent Legitimacy of Multilateralism 15, GARNET
Working Paper No. 09/06, available at http://www.gamet-eu.org/fileadmin/documents/
working-papers/0906.pdf [hereinafter Keohane, Contingent Legitimacy] (discussing the need
for epistemic legitimacy).
103. See, e.g., Jean-Marc Coicaud, Conclusion: International Organizations, the Evolu-
tion of International Politics and Legitimacy, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 10, at 521 (discussing limited mandate, focus, and values).
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constitute the input paradigms.' ° But the focus here is distinct-the fo-
cus is on the ends and not the means.
Assessing the ends necessarily requires a normative judgment about
what is and is not desirable. An even distribution of trade benefits, for
example, may not be an appropriate end, if the normative goal is to
maximize the returns from trade overall without regard to how those re-
turns are distributed.' °5 If fairness is a goal, then trade liberalization may
be sacrificed.'6 As discussed more fully below, almost any legitimacy
claim based on outcome can be challenged by challenging its normative
premise. '° Not surprisingly, given the importance of the normative pre-
scription, it is easier to come to a normative conclusion if the group
reaching that conclusion is an exclusive club organization, rather than a
representative or inclusive one. As Keohane and Nye explain, club or-
ganizations are "dominated by states ... [and] ... largely invisible to
their various publics. They operate[] as clubs of negotiators, often tech-
nically trained, bargaining with one another within specific issue
areas."'08 Clubs support legitimacy claims for themselves and for their
norms through their effectiveness. The WTO, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD), and the Basel Banking Committee have
all been characterized as "clubs."'' 9 These organizations have a normative
agenda that is agreed to by the parties involved, and they remain effec-
tive by exploiting their expertise, limiting access, limiting transparency,
and minimizing the diversity of interests represented."0
Although 1Os that claim output legitimacy justify themselves by
their accomplishments, their accomplishments may be well served by
means that also serve input legitimacy. An expert organization can seek
broader representation in order to enhance its expertise. "The OECD
is, primarily, an exclusive club whose members produce two-thirds of
the world's goods and services ... [and] provides a private setting for
104. Keohane, Contingent Legitimacy, supra note 102, at 5 (noting that output legiti-
macy depends on input legitimacy).
105. See, e.g., Herman E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development: The Ob-
stacle of Free Trade, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L, REV. 33, 34-42 (1992).
106. Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the
Entropic Dilemma, 5 Cm. J. INT'L L. 625, 645-47 (2005) (noting that under the theory of
comparative advantage, more developed countries have an easier task of complying with trade
standards than do lesser developed countries and that there is a need to link free trade with
social regulation).
107. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
108. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 4-5.
111. See Esty, supra note 46, at 1552 (discussing increased legitimacy of the WHO by
incorporating outside experts and input from external sources regarding its Tobacco Treaty).
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wealthy industrialized governments to share experiences, identify issues
of common concern, and coordinate domestic and international poli-
cies."'1 2 The OECD relies on its expertise to achieve desired outcomes
and, as a general rule, does not engage civil society. "3 But, as James
Salzman explains, in the OECD's Mutual Acceptance of Data (MAD)
program, "member countries and non-member countries agree[d] to ac-
cept non-clinical data from one another.""'4 Data tests were developed
with the aid of a host of non-state experts, NGOs, and other members of
civil society."- Salzman explains that efforts to incorporate the knowl-
edge of non-club experts made the MAD program exceptionally
successful and legitimate."1
6
Output legitimacy has its deficiencies. First, the normative goal that
defines effectiveness is assumed.'"7 A challenge to that normative agenda
is a challenge to legitimacy. Second, it is not necessarily inclusive or rep-
resentative (let alone democratic). '1 8 Evaluating the effectiveness of
organizations comprised of members with convergent views seems to
diminish the role of participation in the evaluative process."9 Effective
organizations may also believe that too much process impedes efficient
112. James Salzman, Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189, 191 (2005); see
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development art. 6, Dec. 14,
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 (requiring a consensus among Member States). The
OECD has not embraced participation or transparency. See Salzman, supra, at 194 ("[T]he
OECD has expressly avoided ... transparency, responsiveness and public accountability.");
see also Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 25 (describing the Basel process).
113. See Salzman, supra note 112, at 218-19.
114. Id. at 200.
115. Id. at 202.
116. Id. at 202-03. Nevertheless, the OECD's outreach efforts met failure in another
case. Commentators cite the lack of developing country participation as one factor in the fail-
ure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment. Esty, supra note 46, at 1549; Salzman, supra
note 112, at 197.
117. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 597 (1999). Bo-
dansky notes that the expert model of legitimacy rests on some assumptions: "first, the
decisions in question have better and worse answers; second, certain people possess special
knowledge (expertise) about what those answers are; and third, we (the non-experts) can iden-
tify the people with this special knowledge." Id. at 620.
118. MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD: INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 172 (2005). lOs pursuing liberal ideals are at
times "unabashedly undemocratic." Id. Barnett and Finnemore state, "Harmonizing the sub-
stantively liberal goals of these organizations with procedures that, if not democratic, at least
provide some accountability and representation will be an ongoing task that is essential to the
long term legitimacy of global governance." Id.
119. Cf Stewart, supra note 7, at 70 (noting criticisms of club organizations such as the
WTO and the IMF that claim these organizations impose "measures generated by secret proc-
esses without opportunity for participation and review by affected domestic interests").
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functioning, and, therefore, might sacrifice process as well. 20 Finally, the
output legitimacy model can also lead to false legitimacy claims. ' Per-
ceived expertise can supply an undeserved veneer of output legitimacy.
For example, the IMF relies on output legitimacy, and, in some cases,
that model supports the organization's legitimacy claims, even when the
IMF is not actually effective. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore
have explained how IMF failures at economic stabilization for borrower
countries led to the expansion of IMF activities and authority over those
economies. 22 They explain, "[T]he logic of Fund models suggests that
program failures often result from omitting parts of the economy from
the stabilization program, thereby justifying more expansive condition-
ality in the future."' 2 3 They suggest, however, that such expansion raises
normative questions.'24 More specifically, "as analytic frameworks draw
them into spheres of economic and social life increasingly distant from
their core macroeconomic competencies, the Fund's staff's authority as
experts diminishes and the possibility for poor policy rises. '25
3. Challenges to Secure Input and Output Legitimacy
1Os face a number of challenges when trying to make strong legiti-
macy claims. First, 1Os confront an input/output paradox:"126 securing one
form of legitimacy criteria sometimes comes at the cost of other criteria.
As discussed above, one potential weakness of each approach is that it
sacrifices the other.'27 Secondly, despite the tensions between output and
input legitimacy, there are a variety of pressures on lOs that make it im-
portant for them to secure both input and output criteria. Globalization
demands effective institutions that can address complex problems. 28 lOs
compete with each other to solve these problems, in part by claiming to
be more legitimate.' 29 In addition, the ascendancy of democratic norms
120. However, as Robert Keohane explains, process actually is necessary for output
legitimacy. See generally Keohane, Contingent Legitimacy, supra note 102.
121. See infra notes 301-308 and accompanying text.
122. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 118, at 71.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 72.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 168-69; Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 2 ("The para-
dox is straight-forward: international organizations must be legitimate to be effective; but
effectiveness is subverted by the very process of legitimation."); Hurd, Legitimacy, supra note
11, at 35; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 12 (discussing the paradox of democracy in the
international setting).
127. See supra notes 81-98, 117-125 and accompanying text.
128. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Re-
sources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 277 (2004) (noting the demand for international regimes).
129. 1Os compete with each other by trying to obtain greater compliance. Compliance is
secured in part by securing greater legitimacy. See FRANCK, supra note 8, at 24.
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pressures IOs to seek input legitimacy.3 Finally, legitimacy is necessary
for compliance; 3' thus, to be effective, lOs must be perceived as legiti-
mate.
Although lOs may try to achieve both input and output legitimacy, it
is not difficult to understand how one basis of legitimacy claims might
come at the cost of the other.3 2 Output legitimacy may suffer when lOs
attempt to improve input legitimacy; consensus in developing law be-
comes more difficult to achieve as the number of decision-makers
' 33
increases. Ultimately, one can be left with a decision that is so vague,
aspirational, or littered with exceptions that it is of very limited applica-
bility.'T 4 Likewise, process and procedures slow down lawmaking,
resulting in less responsive, more costly laws. 33 Conversely, output le-
gitimacy may come at the cost of input legitimacy. The hesitancy to
reach out more broadly may stem from the idea that representation or
process may undermine norm-generating effectiveness. 36 It is more diffi-
cult to reach consensus where greater interests are represented.
37
Nevertheless, globalization requires lOs to craft international solu-
tions to complex problems.'38 Businesspeople throughout the world must
engage in commerce, even though different and sometimes conflicting
domestic legal regimes govern their transactions. 139 The social, environ-
mental, developmental, and human costs of globalization need to be
addressed, given that countries embrace vastly different values and ap-S 140
proaches. Whether it is establishing a harmonized securitization
130. Keohane, Contingent Legitimacy, supra note 102, at 11; Raustiala & Victor, supra
note 128, at 277-78 (discussing the alternative to a single regime governing a particular
topic-a "regime complex," comprised of several interconnected elemental regimes).
131. HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 11, at 35 (noting that legitimacy, coercion, and
self-interest are modes of securing compliance); see also FRANCK, supra note 8, at 24.
132. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 45-46.
133. Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 76, at 4.
134. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 45-46 (noting the danger
of "bland generalities").
135. Id. at 2.
136. Id. at 15-16 (discussing "tension between legitimation and effective rulemaking,"
resulting from increased representation).
137. Id. at 45-46.
138. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 19, at 226; Andrew Hurrell, Power, Institutions and
the Production of Inequality, in POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 34 (Michael Barnett &
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005); see, e.g., UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, para. 1.
139. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 295 (discussing elemental regimes in regime
complexes).
140. Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking
U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 459 (2002) (stating that "[d]ifferent states at different
levels of development and with different national value systems will have different socioeco-
nomic priorities"); see, e.g., Tracey DiLascio, How Safe Is the Safe Harbor? U.S. and E.U.
Data Privacy Law and the Enforcement of the FTC's Safe Harbor Program, 22 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 399, 402-03 (2004) (discussing different approaches to data privacy).
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system or coordinating the use of pesticides in agricultural products,
globalization challenges 1Os to come up with solutions in spite of differ-
ent backgrounds, approaches, and values. 4 '
lOs compete with other 1Os to address these problems.'4 2 For exam-
ple, both WIPO and the WTO regulate intellectual property. 43 The
Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the
SPS both, to some extent, affect standards relating to genetically modi-
fied organisms." Several lOs have grappled with issues of international
• '45
investments. The World Bank and the OECD have addressed corrup-
tion.'4 6 UNCITRAL and the World Bank have tackled international
141. Cf Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 295 (noting that rules from one regime or
forum may challenge rules from another).
142. Coicaud, supra note 103, at 522; cf Jeffrey Wah-Teck Chan, Principal Senior State
Counsel, Sing., Allocation of Work Among Formulating Agencies, Address at Model Law for
Global Commerce: Congress to Celebrate the Fortieth Annual Session of UNCITRAL, para.
17 (July 9, 2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Chan.pdf (dis-
cussing contributing factors to coordination problems and explaining that institutions evolve
and develop a life of their own); Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, supra
note 46, at 328 (discussing the problems at the "joints [of] regime complexes"); see also
Heifer, Mediating, supra note 39, at 134-35 (explaining how competition affects 1O behavior).
Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor refer to "elemental regimes"-individual regimes that over-
lap with other regimes in terms of "scope, subject and time"-as forming what they refer to as
"regime complexes." They encourage analyzing these complexes systematically across various
fields. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 279.
143. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Convention Es-
tablishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Doc. WO029EN (Sept. 28,
1979, amended Sept. 28, 1979).
144. SPS Agreement, supra note 2; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention
on Biological Diversity art. 2, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (supplementary agreement to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) negotiated under the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP), opened for signature at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992
and entered into force in December 1993); United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
145. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal Instru-
ments-Results Of The Uruguay Round, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186; OECD Declaration and
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic Texts,
DAFFE/IME(2000)20 (Nov. 9, 2000); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, Annex I at 159-217, U.N. Doc.
UNCTADITEIIIT/7 (1998).
146. See Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption
Efforts: Current Legal and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'y 315 (2004); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 1997 U.S.T. LEXIS 105, 37 I.L.M. 1
(1999) [hereinafter OECD Convention on Combating Bribery]; Sope Williams, The Debar-
ment Of Corrupt Contractors From World Bank-Financed Contracts, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277,
280-83 (2007) (explaining the Bank's policies); Strengthening the Bank Group Engagement
on Governance and Anticorruption, available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/
comments/govemancefeedback/gacpaperpdf; Global Coalition for Africa, Past Activities, 25
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insolvency.14 The ILO has competed with UNESCO. 48 Where one 1O
fails to take up the law-making mantle, there are other organizations
ready to use their cloak of authority and expand their mandate.'
4 9
Through their existing authority and reputation, lOs can generate new
ideas, act as coalition builders, and branch into new subject areas."'
Sometimes these regimes have reached beyond what their framers in-
tended. 5' Naturally, as lOs approach conflict, one may begin again to
question which 10 may legitimately act, and which norms should prevail
in the case of a conflict.' As a result, 1Os try to offer some comparative
advantage over other alternatives.' That advantage may come in the
form of a stronger legitimacy claim, whether based on input criteria,
output criteria, or, ideally, both.
Effective IOs, which generate useful norms and secure compliance
with those norms, will be seen as more legitimate than those that do
not. 5 4 But effectiveness is also linked to input criteria. The rise of de-
mocratic norms worldwide suggests that democratic values influence
societal perceptions concerning the duty to obey norms."' Keohane
makes the point that the ascendancy of democracy in the twenty-first
century requires that multilateral institutions respond to civil society and
the larger interests they represent in order to be effective.' They can no
Principles to Combat Corruption, available at http://www.gca-cma.org/epastact.htm; The
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724; Declaration
Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 51/191,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 36 I.L.M. 1043 (1997).
147. See UNCITRAL 2004 Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722 Ebook.pdf; The World Bank,
Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (2001),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/Insolvency%20Principles%20and%2OGuidelines
%20April %202001.pdf.
148. Compare UNESCO, Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1982/2/Add.1, Annex 5 (1982), available at http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/
RACEE.PDF (addressing racial discrimination in employment), with ILO, Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 86th Session, Geneva (1998), available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.static..jump?var -anguage=EN&var-_p
agename=DECLARATIONTEXT (aspiring to "the elimination of discrimination in respect of
employment and occupation").
149. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 118, at 6, 18, 162.
150. Id. at 162.
151. See Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, supra note 46, at 328
(discussing IOs extending beyond their original mandates).
152. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 118, at 163 (discussing the effects of expan-
sion); see also Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 295 (discussing how rules from different
forums may conflict with each other).
153. Coicaud, supra note 103, at 522.
154. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 15 (discussing the importance of effectiveness).
155. Keohane, Contingent Legitimacy, supra note 102, at 11 (discussing the revival of
"ideologies of democratic governance").
156. Id. at 3-6; see also Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 14, at 407.
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longer rely on a statist construction of legitimacy in order to secure their
normative goals.157 Thus, despite the input/output paradox, lOs must se-
cure both input and output legitimacy.
One can predict that as globalization continues, democracy ascends,
and 10 competition persists, lOs will increase their efforts to secure in-
put and output legitimacy in order to address global challenges. 5 8 One
way they do so is by forming alliances in which they share resources and
develop norms with other 1Os. These alliances are made possible by
linkage and accommodation, mechanisms that have both positive and
negative consequences.
II. INSTITUTIONAL ALLIANCES
lOs use linkage and accommodation to form alliances from which
they derive legitimacy. Linkage and accommodation allow lOs to part-
ner, coordinate, endorse, and share expertise in order to answer the
challenges of globalization and improve their legitimacy claims. The
legitimacy gained from these alliances is derivative, as each 1O imbues
the alliance, and to some extent the other 10, with its input and/or output
criteria. And the very act of allying can strengthen claims of input le-
gitimacy through inclusion. The act of allying may also lead to better
norm generation and compliance. These benefits are neither certain nor
costless. Whether the alliance should be credited with derivative legiti-
macy depends on relationships between the lOs and how each 1O
functions within the alliance.
A. Linkage and Accommodation as Institutional Alliances
Linkage and accommodation describe instances in which regimes or
forums incorporate, either explicitly or implicitly, the rules, decisions, or
norms of another regime or forum. Linkage involves the influence of one
10's norms, decisions, or rules on another 10 in an affirmative way."9
Others have already set forth the different linkage types and rationales in
great detail.' 6 For example, an 1O might affirmatively consider the ex-
157. Keohane, Contingent Legitimacy, supra note 102, at 3-6. Keohane specifically
suggests that an organization should meet the standards of "inclusiveness, decisiveness and
epistemic reliability." Id. at 15.
158. See id. (discussing the institutional prerequisites to legitimacy); see also Block-Lieb
& Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing the "crippling dissensus in global
bodies").
159. David Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 10-11 (2002).
160. Id. at 16-24.
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161pertise of another 10 and reference that expertise in making a decision.
Accommodation is similar to linkage in that it occurs when one regime
implicitly acknowledges the norms, rules, or decisions of another; 62 it
allows regimes to avoid conflicts. 63 It may take the form of a clear de-
marcation of boundaries, so that one 10 does not contradict another, or it
may involve an effort to avoid future conflicts through the use of savings
clauses.'6 Thus, for example, where the drafters of the Cartagena Proto-
col crafted a precautionary principle akin to that of the WTO's SPS
Agreement, those drafters accommodated the WTO. 165 The Protocol does
not invoke the SPS Agreement, but it parrots the language used there,
implicitly accommodating the values in that agreement. 166
Linkage and accommodation can operate in tandem, allying regimes
or forums and providing new strategic opportunities for regimes and the
constituencies that they affect. Others have already detailed some exam-
ples of connections in the intellectual property field, including those
between the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO). 167 Jos6 Alvarez has documented linkage involving the World
Bank setting norms by cross-referencing other arrangements and re-
gimes.68 Alvarez details the "technocratic regulation" of the World Bank
Guidelines:
The Guidelines even incorporate by reference some of the UN's
products, such as the [U.N.] Convention on Biological Diversity,
the 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, the FAO Guidelines for Packag-
ing and Storage of Pesticides, and programmatic instruments
161. For example, the WTO's SPS Agreement cross-references the Codex. See infra
notes 259-264 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly, Power Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an
International Actor and Its Influence on Other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
79, 91-92 (2006) [hereinafter Kelly, Power Linkage and Accommodation] (discussing at-
tempts to avoid conflict among regimes).
163. See, e.g., id. at 120 (discussing the Cartagena Protocol's accommodation of the SPS
Agreement).
164. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 297, 301 (citing boundary setting and savings
clauses as examples of conflict-avoiding measures).
165. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 120.
166. Id. at 114-16.
167. See, e.g., Mamey L. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in
International Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 277 (2001); Helfer, Mediating, supra note 39, at 132-33 (discussing, inter alia,
applications for observer status at the WTO and WIPO, the formal 1995 agreement between
WIPO and the WTO to share information, "provide technical and legal assistance to develop-
ing countries that are members only of the other organization," and "delegate[] to WIPO
certain administrative functions"); Leebron, supra note 159, at 19-20 (discussing regime bor-
rowing between the WTO and WIPO).
168. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 3, at 237.
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generated from UN policy conferences such as Agenda 21 of the
1995 Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-based Activities. By requiring that the
Bank, and, to the extent the terms are incorporated in its loans,
its borrowers, comply with such instruments, the Bank strength-
ens compliance with both soft and hard law produced by it and
other lOs. The World Bank Guidelines, no less than some trea-
ties, are a mechanism to "harden" a dense network of otherwise
"soft law" norms or treaties whose terms are vague or that have
drawn few parties.
69
Cross-references as a means of linkage are ubiquitous. 70 But, they are
only one type of relationship among lOs. The depth and scope of the
various types of relationships depend in part on the reason for each par-
ticular alliance and the particular linkage or accommodation employed
to support that alliance.
The reasons for alliances can be complex. lOs may ally because of
normative, strategic, or sanctioning reasons."' Linkage or accommoda-
tion may occur as a reaction to 1O power, for strategic reasons, or as a
reaction to 10 linkage. 72 Neither linkage nor accommodation is intrinsi-
cally bad or good. They are tools. Arguably, linkage is explicit while
accommodation is implicit, and thus accommodation may more easily
obfuscate debate, 73 but it is not necessary that it does so. Finally, the
quest for legitimacy may also explain linkage and accommodation, as
these tools allow 1Os to borrow or derive legitimacy from other lOs.
B. A Typology of Linkage and Accommodation
Alliances among organizations occur as a result of linkage and ac-
commodation, creating derivative legitimacy for the alliance and its
resulting norms. These alliances may improve the resulting law, making
it more representative, inclusive, procedurally fair, or effective. Alterna-
tively, these alliances may simply lead to the perception of more
representation, inclusion, process, or effectiveness. As legitimacy is a
subjective belief, it is not possible to objectively assess the validity of
that belief. However, one can assess an organization's or law's claim to
legitimacy using objective criteria. Thus, an objective framework can be
used to assess legitimacy claims that result in subjective perceptions of
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id.
171. Leebron, supra note 159, at 11-15 (discussing a taxonomy of linkage claims).
172. Kelly, Power Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 91-92 (explaining
linkage and accommodation).
173. Id. at 116-17.
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legitimacy. In order to choose a framework, I create a typology of alli-
ances so as to examine each type and pinpoint any problems it might
raise for a legitimacy analysis. On a continuum from greater to lesser
integration, the types are as follows: partnering, coordination, endorse-
ments, and resource sharing.
1. Partnering
Sometimes organizations form partnerships. The lOs form a partner-
ship alliance in order to work together on a law-making project.
Partnering can be a deep or shallow commitment. Partnerships can in-
volve both linkage and accommodation. The alliance will link the IOs
together in their approach and will accommodate each 10's values where
possible. 74 Partnership implies that the partners have worked through a
problem together, using process and dialogue as part of a joint effort.
Partnership also suggests that the partners have considered each other's
views, although the partners may-or may not--exclude the views of
others. Partnerships may or may not be effective.
Norms developed in partnerships derive legitimacy in several ways.
A partnership alliance may lead to more effective norm generation, or it
may be more inclusive. The partnership may claim the legitimacy of its
constituent 1Os so that others will perceive its norms as more legitimate.
Two examples of partnerships are described below.
UNCITRAL and the World Bank. UNCITRAL is a governmental
norm-generating forum. It develops law in various forms (conventions,
model laws, legislative guides) that States choose whether to adopt. 5
States are involved in the drafting of UNCITRAL products but do not
commit ex ante to adopt the products. 116 The perceived legitimacy of
these products affects whether States ultimately adopt them.
77
UNCITRAL's claims to legitimacy stem from both input and output
legitimacy criteria. Established by the General Assembly to harmonize
and unify the law of international trade, UNCITRAL members are
representative of the world's geographic and economic groups. 78 In its
legislative activities it relies on a framework of inclusiveness. 7 9 It
174. For another example of a partnership not listed here, see the description of the rela-
tionship between the VTO and WIPO in Helfer, Mediating, supra note 39, at 132-33.
175. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 1-2, 13.
176. Id. at 1, 4-5.
177. See Medhat Hassanein & Asif Chida, Legal Mechanisms to Empower Informal
Businesses 7 (July 10, 2007) (unpublished presentation), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/congress/Medhat Hassanein.pdf.
178. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 1, 2-3.
179. See Jos6 Angelo Estrella Faria, The Relationship Between Formulating Agencies in
International Legal Harmonization: Competition, Cooperation, or Peaceful Coexistence? A
Few Remarks on the Experience of UNCITRAL, 51 Loy. L. REv. 253, 276 (2005)
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operates through several working groups composed of experts in the
relevant substantive fields and delegates from the Member States. Other
organizations partner with UNCITRAL, committing to the substantive
project.'
Both UNCITRAL and its commentators have touted the forum's ef-
fectiveness and its alliances with other organizations.' As a norm-
generating forum, UNCITRAL's effectiveness and the effectiveness of
the partnerships it forms can be assessed based on whether States actu-
ally adopt its norms, standards, or rules. For example, a number of
UNCITRAL's products have enjoyed considerable success. The United
Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (1978) has thirty-
. 82
two signatories, and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (1980) has seventy signatories.'83 The
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (1958) has been a tremendous success, with 142 signatories."
Other projects, while highly regarded, have been less successful.
Those that have failed to enter into force or gain widespread acceptance
include the United Nations Convention on International Bills of Ex-
change and International Promissory Notes (1988), which has five States
parties (short of the ten States parties required for entry into force)I 5;
and the United Nations Convention on the Liability of Operators of
Transport Terminals in International Trade (1991), which requires five
signatories but has only four.186 UNCITRAL's model laws have also en-
joyed mixed results.'87
("UNCITRAL tries to limit the risk of duplication by involving ... all multilateral financial
institutions in its own projects."). Further, UNCITRAL has been successful in parlaying this
inclusive approach into more uniform projects. As a representative institution, however,
UNCITRAL sometimes struggles to reach consensus. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitima-
tion, supra note 1, at 4-5 (chronicling UNCITRAL's decision to adopt a legislative guide on
insolvency law, as opposed to a model law or convention).
180. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 10, para. 24.
181. Id. at 10 (discussing UNCITRAL's coordinating role); Block-Lieb & Halliday,
Legitimation, supra note 1, at 14-15 (discussing UNCITRAL's technical and representative
expertise).
182. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Status of Conventions and Model
Law, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/626 (May 25, 2007) [hereinafter Status of Conventions and
Model Law].
183. Id.
184. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2539, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; Noah Rubins, The
Enforcement and Annulment of International Arbitration Awards in Indonesia, 20 AM. U.
INT'L L. REV. 359, 360 (2005).
185. Status of Conventions and Model Law, supra note 182, para. 4.
186. Id.
187. See id. paras. 5-14.
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Although each UNCITRAL project is unique, in its Legislative
Guide on Insolvency (Guide), UNCITRAL worked with many States and
international actors as partners. The Guide, for example, draws on earlier
World Bank works to set key objectives.'88 In turn, the World Bank has
derived legitimacy from UNCITRAL by accommodating the Guide and
linking its Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Sys-
tems (Principles) to UNCITRAL." 9 To promote the Principles, the
World Bank partnered with UNCITRAL and the organizations partici-
pating in the Guide to ensure consistency between the Principles and the
Guide.'9
The United Nations Forum on Forests and the Collaborative Part-
nership on Forests. The Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF), a
unique network of fourteen IOs, was established on the recommendation
of the U.N. ECOSOC.' 9' The partnership is part of the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO) in the United Nations and provides expertise to
the U.N. Forum on Forests (UNFF).'92 It also works to support and
implement specific proposals for action established by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Forests (IPF) and the Intergovernmental Forum on
Forests (IFF).' 93
The success of the CPF hinges on the success of the UNFF. Al-
though the IPF and IFF were somewhat successful, both initiatives
occurred prior to the establishment of the CPF. Indeed, the CPF formed
in response to IPF and IFF proposals to develop a legal framework on
forests. Its efforts have been less than successful, and despite the size
and seeming inclusiveness of this partnership, it faces serious criticism.
188. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 49.
189. See World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems
(Revised) 2005, at 2 (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org (search for "Prin-
ciples for Effective Insolvency (Revised) 2005"; then follow "The World Bank" hyperlink).
190. Id.
191. Collaborative Partnership on Forests, About CPF, http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/
44935/en (last visited May 5, 2008). Partnership is built into the U.N. system, as the U.N.
Charter directs specialized agencies within the system to coordinate activities. U.N. Charter
arts. 57-58.
192. The Collaborative Partnership on Forests' (CPF) Framework to Support the Work
of the UNFF, at 4 (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/webview/media?
mediald=4779&langld= 1.
193. Id. For a critical discussion of these proposals, see Forest Peoples Programme,
Briefing on the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) and Collaborative Partnership
on Forests (CPF) (Dec. 2004), available at www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi-igo/unff-
briefcpf.dec04_eng.shtml [hereinafter Forest Peoples Programme]; see also U.N. Forum on
Forests, About UNFF: IPF/IFF Process (1995-2000), http://www.un.org/esa/forests/
ipf_iff.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2008). Interestingly, one organization that is not a member is
the Forest Stewardship Council, an international NGO that sets nominally voluntary standards.
For a description of the power these standards are garnering, see Errol Meidinger, The Admin-
istrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forests, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L.
47 (2006).
Summer 20081
Michigan Journal of International Law
Some claim that the CPF "has done little to advance implementation of
international commitments on forests at the local and national levels."
'94
Debate continues concerning the adoption of a convention on forests and
has delayed the project until at least 2016.9' Critics also complain of a
lack of transparency at the UNFF and of a process that prevents mean-
ingful participation by all interested parties. '96 Others complain of an
absence of real dialogue or debate at the sessions in that it consists
merely of delegates repeating what they have been instructed to say by
their respective governments.' 97 Some question whether the UNFF can
have any possible impact on forests. 19
One NGO, Forests and the European Union Resource Network
(FERN),' 99 reported on the failings of the UNFF, noting that the process
could not even be evaluated due to insufficient data resulting from
UNFF's failures over the years." The report points out that "although an
evaluation questionnaire was sent out, ... only the EU and fourteen
other countries (including two EU countries) sent their response back to
the UNFF secretariat, thereby ruling out any meaningful evaluation." 20'
FERN believes that UNFF has grossly failed in its objectives of monitor-
ing and reporting. According to the report, only eight of the 191
countries (about four percent of the membership) had reported to the
secretariat on progress made on forest management. 20 There was also a
194. Forest Peoples Programme, supra note 193.
195. UNFF-Did Anyone Notice?, EU FOREST WATCH (FERN, Brussels), Mar. 2006,
available at http://www.fem.org/media/documents/document 3525_3526.pdf.
196. See FERN, FERN Special Report: Live or Let Die? An Evaluation of the Fifth Ses-
sion of the United Nations Forum on Forests 1 (July 2005) (prepared by Leontien Krul),
available at http://www.fem.org/media/documents/document_1582_1583.pdf [hereinafter
FERN Special Report]. The FERN report criticizes the participatory process at UNFF. FERN
places particular blame for the failure at UNFF 5 on countries from the South, naming Cuba
and Venezuela as the countries that have blocked meaningful integration of the topics dis-
cussed in Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue into the main sessions of UNFF. Id. at 2 (stating also
that "[t]he Major Groups [other than States] could not speak during any text negotiations but
only at the plenary-and then only after all Member States had spoken"). In other words,
besides not having a direct say in the negotiations of texts, Major Groups would speak after
most delegates had already left the room. The FERN report concludes that the UNFF is in-
stead being used by some countries as a shield against revealing the lack of progress made on
promoting SFM. Id.
197. United Nations Forum on Forests: Was Anyone Listening?, WRM BULL. (World
Rainforest Movement, Montevideo, Uruguay), May 2004, available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/
bulletin/ 82/UNFEhtml.
198. UNFF-Did Anyone Notice?, supra note 195.
199. Welcome to FERN-the Forests and the European Union Resource Network, http://
www.fem.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
200. FERN Special Report, supra note 196, at 1.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 29:605
Institutional Alliances & Derivative Legitimacy
noticeable lack of response from heavily forested countries in the South.
Of the eight States that responded, six were European.2 3
Recently, the UNFF has made some progress by adopting a Non-
legally Binding Instrument on All Types of Forests.2 The instrument sets
forth principles to which States commit themselves to promote sustain-
able forest management. 25 Nevertheless, critics complain that the
instrument is weak, 2°6 ignores the views and values of indigenous peo-
ples, and lacks means of implementation and funding.207
2. Coordination
Coordination involves a consideration of what the other 10 has done,
or can do, to generate or promote its norms. Thus, 1Os with vastly differ-
ent agendas might coordinate by making accommodations for each other.
The alliance would recognize that each 10 has an agenda or set of values
and try to coordinate activities so that one does not interfere with the
other. In this way, the alliance derives input legitimacy from each 10 and
will likely avoid conflicts and be more effective. Alternatively, where the
lOs have similar values or agendas, the alliance might coordinate to take
advantage of efficiencies, synergies, and leverage that come from work-
ing together. In such cases, the alliance becomes more effective while
making each of the lOs more effective, garnering derivative legitimacy
for itself, and strengthening the legitimacy claims of the constituent 1Os.
The WHO and the WTO. The World Health Organization (WHO) is
the U.N. organization addressing issues relating to global public health.
It sets standards and norms, conducts research, and provides technical
assistance to States. There are 193 Member States that have accepted the
WHO Constitution.208 The WHO's Health Assembly is comprised of all
203. Id.
204. U.N. Forum on Forests, Feb. 24, 2006, & Apr. 16-27, 2007, Report of the Seventh
Session, U.N. Doc E/CN. 18/2007/8, E/2007/42, available at http://www.un.org.
205. Id.
206. See Andrei Laletin et al., UNFF Adopts... the Status Quo, FOREST COVER (Global
Forest Coalition, Amsterdam, Neth.), June 2007, at 8-9, available at http://www.wrm.org.uy/
GFC/cover/ForestCover22.pdf.
207. UNFF Fails Indigenous Peoples Again (2007), available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/
documents/ifi igo/unff7_briefingmay07 eng.pdf. To be fair, the World Bank has developed
strategies to address funding SFM. See, e.g., Sustaining Forests, A World Bank Strategy
(2003), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/extemaldefaultlWDSContentServer/
WDSP/IB/2006/10/06000011823_20061006154640/Rendered/PDF/ 35535.pdf.
208. Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 6349, 14
U.N.T.S. 185, as amended and reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS 1 (47th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
WHO Constitution]. The Health Assembly was established to carry out the work of the WHO.
Id. art. 9. It meets annually and its functions include, inter alia, formulating WHO policies,
establishing committees, identifying health issues of which the Executive Board and Director-
General may inform Member States, and considering recommendations made by other U.N.
organs that have any "bearing on health." Id. art. 18. The Health Assembly is also authorized
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member nations and its Executive Board is constitutionally required to
be geographically representative. WHO staff are experts who assist
member nations in their negotiations of conventions. The WHO is em-
powered to "act as the directing and co-ordinating authority on
international health work."' 0 It performs a wide variety of informational,
research, supportive, and standard-setting activity."' Among its standard-
setting powers, the WHO has the power to issue binding regulations,
although it does not often exercise that power.1 2 Daniel Esty explains
that this hesitancy reflects staff concerns about "the legitimacy of an ag-
gressive global governance role for the WHO."23
One recent WHO coordination effort revealed an attempt by the
WHO to improve its legitimacy claims. The WHO "recognized the need
to expand the legitimacy of [its] governance activities" when it sought to
regulate tobacco. '4 As Esty explains, the WHO's efforts to conclude the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)2"5 demonstrated an
instance in which the WHO relied in part on process legitimacy and in
particular on "good governance and the deployment of the tools of ad-
ministrative law.' 216 The organization did this by engaging the public and
other institutions to partner in its work.2 7 Its efforts included reaching
out to the WTO and the World Bank.21 8 While it may go too far to catego-
rize the WHO's engagement as accommodation, it does open the door to
allow for accommodation of the norms, values, and rules from these
"to adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the
Organization." Id. art. 19.
209. Id. art. 24.
210. Id. art. 2(a).
211. The Role of WHO in Public Health, http://www.who.int/about/role/en/index.html
(last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
212. WHO Constitution, supra note 208, art. 21; see also Esty, supra note 46, at 1550-
51 (noting that the WHO typically uses non-binding resolutions).
213. Esty, supra note 46, at 1551.
214. Id. at 1552.
215. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, June 16, 2003, available at
http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/en/.
216. Esty, supra note 46, at 1552.
217. Id. Esty stated that
[a]s they moved to legislate limits on tobacco globally, the WHO staff developed
draft provisions, posted these on the WHO website, held public hearings, convened
open dialogues with NGOs and private sector representatives, accepted policy pa-
pers and other inputs from external sources, and encouraged debate by posting
these materials on the Internet.
Id.
218. Esty noted that this type of dialogue was atypical for the WHO, which seems to rely
more on expertise and less on process and the use of administrative law tools to promote its
legitimacy. Id. at 1552-53 (explaining the WHO's focus on a culture of expertise at the ex-
pense of the "global public health policymaking process").
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other 1Os. In fact, a 2002 joint report took note of the various trade rules
and specific trade cases in which restrictions on tobacco could or did
cause a conflict with WTO rules. 2' 9 The report endorsed efforts to reduce
smoking worldwide so long as those efforts did not conflict with trade
220rules .22
Subsequently, the report noted that the WHO's then current draft of
the FCTC proposed that restrictions on tobacco "shall not constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination on international
trade ' 22' The articulated standard accommodated WTO norms, which
call for measures not imposing "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"
on trade.222 This language, however, did not make it into the Conven-
223tion. The report identified WTO agreements that could be implicated
by measures to reduce tobacco usage, including the Technical Barriers to
Trade Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, and the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. 224 Nevertheless, as Joost
Pauwelyn explains, attempts to situate the WTO Agreements as inher-
ently superior to the FCTC were eventually thwarted when language
acknowledging the obligations under prior treaties was deleted in favor
of relying on the general rules of treaty interpretation found in the Vi-
225enna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Indeed, the WHO faced criticism for procedures that allowed special
interests, including the cigarette companies, to influence the FCTC. 26 An
expert report on the influence of tobacco companies revealed that the
industry used other U.N. organizations, as well as state delegates, to in-
fluence the WHO process more generally.
221
219. WTO Agreements & Public Health: A Joint Study by the WHO and WTO
Secretariat (2002), available at http://www.who.int/media/homepage/en/who-wto-e.pdf (last
visited Aug. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Joint Study].
220. Id. ("[R]educing tariffs and eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade [] does not pre-
vent governments applying non-discriminatory internal taxes and certain other measures
which they may consider appropriate to safeguard public health.").
221. Id. 138.
222. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 20, Oct. 30, 1947. 61 Stat. A-11, 54
U.N.T.S. 194.
223. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, supra note 215; Joost
Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for
"Conflict Diamonds", 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1177, 1201-02 (2003) [hereinafter Pauwelyn,
WTO Compassion].
224. Joint Study, supra note 219, at 75-76.
225. Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion, supra note 223, at 1201-02.
226. Esty, supra note 46, at 1552-53.
227. Comm. of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents, WHO, Tobacco Company
Strategies to Undermine the Tobacco Control Activities at the World Trade Organization, 39-45,
48 (July 1, 2000), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/context/tc/article/ll07/type/pdf/
viewcontent/ [hereinafter Tobacco Company Strategies].
Summer 2008]
Michigan Journal of International Law
The World Bank and the WTO. The World Bank is not a law-
generating institution, but, as a proponent of certain rules and practices,
it plays a critical role in promoting international legal and non-legal
norms. In 1996, the World Bank and the WTO entered into an agreement
to "consult and exchange views on all matters of common interest,,
228
allow each organization to observe each other's meetings 2 ' and allow
access to the other's research and databases. 230 The World Bank has a
series of programs that accommodate and support WTO norms. A num-
ber of these programs involve partnerships with the WTO relating to
agriculture, including Trade Liberalization, Rural Poverty, and the Envi-
ronment; Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda in the WTO
Negotiations; Standards and Trade Development Facility; and Integrated
Framework for Trade Related Technical Assistance.23' These projects
accommodate trade liberalization norms and increase the World Bank's
relevance to developing countries seeking to operate more effectively
within the WTO framework.
One manifestation of the coordination between the WTO and the
Bank is the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assis-
tance to Least-Developed Countries (Integrated Framework).232 The
Integrated Framework brings together a number of agencies (United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the WTO, the
World Bank, the IMF, and the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP)) in order to help developing countries with economic growth. It
was introduced by the WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996.
The Integrated Framework involves a diagnostic process whereby a team
of experts evaluates a country's economic competitiveness.233 They then
develop an action plan that "spells out a set of policy recommendations
228. Agreement, Decision Adopted by the General Council at Its Meeting on 7, 8 and 13
November 1996, 2, WT/L/194 (Nov. 18, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/cohere/wt 1I94_e.doc [hereinafter Cooperation Agreement].
229. Id. I 4(a).
230. See id. 2. According to the VTO's press release, the Cooperation Agreement
provides the WTO with valuable access to the "Bank's Economic and Social Database
(BESD)" and the "World Debt Tables." Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO and World
Bank Sign Cooperation Agreement (Apr. 28, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/pres97_e/pr72_e.htm.
231. See World Bank Agriculture and Rural Development Partnerships, http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTARD/O,,contentMDK:20451169-pa
gePK:148956-piPK:216618-theSitePK:336682,00.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2008). The
Integrated Framework involved partnerships with four other lOs: the IMF, the International
Trade Centre, UNCTAD, and UNDP. See Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical
Assistance to Least Developed Countries, http://www.integratedframework.org (last visited
Aug. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Integrated Framework].
232. Id.
233. Id. at http://www.integratedframework.org/diagphase.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2008) [hereinafter Integrated Framework: Implementation: Diagnostic Phase].
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and priority technical assistance needs. ' 234 Thus, for example, the action
plan for Ethiopia focused primarily on moving forward with WTO suc-
cession. The action matrix for Tanzania suggests broadening the tax
base so as to reduce import tariffs.236 Despite its laudable goals, some
have characterized the Integrated Framework as a failure.'
The ILO and the Bretton Woods Institutions.238 The ILO has pursued
an ongoing campaign to work with the Bretton Woods Institutions in
order to integrate its "decent work agenda" into the activities of these
institutions.239 It sought and achieved entrance as an observer institution
in the governance structure of the Bretton Woods Institutions and has
sought a "progressive movement towards greater policy integration."
240
The ILO has also sought to infuse its policies concerning core labor
standards on a state level by its coordination with these institutions.24
One can see the potential for the ILO to harden soft law if, for example,
the World Bank or the IMF were to incorporate ILO standards into their
work with specific countries.
The ILO claims that this incorporation is actually happening and that
there is a "policy convergence" between the ILO and the Bretton Woods
242Institutions. In particular, the ILO has noted that through its
participation and dialogue with the IMF and the World Bank, these
institutions have incorporated ILO comments in their final work
products. 4 ' These comments further ILO legal norms articulated in its
234. Id. at http://www.integratedframework.org/ifcountries.htm (last visited Aug. 21,
2008).
235. See id. at http://www.integratedframework.orglcountries/ethiopia.htm (last visited
Aug. 21, 2008).
236. See id. at http://www.integratedframework.org/countries/tanzania.htm (last visited
Aug. 21,2008).
237. See, e.g., Eugenia McGill, Policy and Social Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More
Coherent Approach?, 27 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 371, 399-400 (2004) (discussing the
Integrated Framework's poor functioning); Gregory Shaffer, Can .WTO Technical Assistance
and Capacity-Building Serve Developing Countries?, 23 Wis. INT'L L.J. 643, 658-60, 666-67
(2005) (noting shortcomings and criticisms of the Integrated Framework).
238. The Bretton Woods Institutions are the IMF and the World Bank and were estab-
lished in 1944 to promote "a postwar economic order based on notions of consensual
decision-making and cooperation in the realm of trade and economic relations." What are the
Bretton Woods Institutions? (Bretton Woods Project), http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/
item.shtml?x=320747 (last visited Oct. 15, 2008). Additionally, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, which eventually became the WTO, grew out of the failed attempt at Bret-
ton Woods to establish the International Trade Organization. Id.
239. See generally ILO, ILO Relations with Bretton Woods Institutions, GB.279/ESP/1





243. Id. para. 5. The Report notes that
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conventions and declarations, such as the Declaration of Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work,24 and reflect an ongoing dialogue. As a
result of this dialogue, these Bretton Woods Institutions have linked
themselves to the ILO principles and norms.
The ILO has been less successful in linking itself to the WTO, or
even getting it to accommodate ILO legal norms. The WTO resisted ILO
linkage in both the Singapore Declaration245 and the Doha Declaration.4 6
This attempted linkage illustrates an attempt to regime shift-to move
the implementation of labor norms to a new forum in order to promote
• 247
compliance. One can see why the ILO might want to link with other
institutions. If the ILO can coordinate with them, it may be able to pro-
248mote compliance with its norms through those institutions.
3. Endorsements
Endorsements involve 1Os touting each other's work products as
worthwhile. Where the endorsed product is soft law, it can be hardened
into binding law through an endorsement by particular lOs. The en-
[t]he IMF's twice-yearly World Economic Outlook (WEO) is a significant
component of the IMFC's agenda, and since 1995 the ILO has had the opportunity
to provide its views to the IMF secretariat on the draft reports. From the outset, the
impact of ILO inputs was generally perceived to have been less than anticipated.
Nevertheless, some welcome changes were noted in the draft of the April WEO,
including acknowledgement of the need to promote domestic ownership of the
reform agenda through the closer involvement of unions, employers' organizations
and other representatives of civil society in its design.
Id. The Report continues,
Also welcome was the more cautious stance taken on capital account liberalization,
with poor and some middle-income countries being advised to delay this until they
are better able to cope with the greater risk involved. The statements at the IMFC
provide an opportunity to reinforce the ILO's main messages, and it is interesting to
note that the ILO's comments on the April 2000 draft WEO had a more substantive
impact on the final document than in the past.
Id.
244. ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (June 1998),
available at http://www.ilo.org/declaration.
245. See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996, WT/
MIN(96)/DEC, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min96_e/wtodec_
e.htm.
246. WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I, 41
I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/ministe/min0l_e/
mindecle.htm.
247. See, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. I, 20-23
(2004) [hereinafter Heifer, Regime Shifting] (discussing regime shifting motivations with re-
spect to intellectual property).
248. ILO, ILO Relations with Bretton Woods Institutions, supra note 239, at 3.
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dorsed 10 (and its norms) derives legitimacy from the endorsement, but
so does the endorsing 1O. The endorsing 10 proclaims its legitimacy to
endorse. The resulting alliance has derivative legitimacy cumulated from
each of the lOs.
UNCITRAL and Private Norm-Generating Forums. UNCITRAL has
linked itself to private norm-generating forums by endorsing their prod-
ucts. It has "endorsed" the work of the Institute of International Banking
Law and Practice, which promulgated the International Standby Prac-
tices (ISP98) as well as the ICC's Uniform Customs and Practices for
Documentary Credits (UCP 500).249 In its endorsements, UNCITRAL
bestows legitimacy on both institutions, while at the same time enhanc-
ing its own legitimacy as the arbiter of sound commercial practices for
international trade. The ICC has also entered the endorsement game by
adopting ISP98 250 and endorsing the UNCITRAL Convention on Inde-
pendent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit.251
The FAO's Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesti-
cides and the World Bank. Alvarez documents how the World Bank has
seemingly codified the advisory rules of the FAO Code of Conduct on
the Distribution and Use of Pesticides by incorporating them into loan
252
agreements with States. Its Agricultural Investment Sourcebook targets
249. UNCITRAL, June 12-July 7, 2000, Report of the 33rd Session, 434, U.N. Doc
A/55/17 (Aug. 10, 2000) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, 33rd Session]; UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra
note 27, 27. The ICC has also adopted the ISP98 and endorsed the UNCITRAL Convention
on Independent Guarantees and Stand-by Letters of Credit. See Int'l Chamber of Commerce,
Policy Statement: ICC Endorsement of the UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guaran-
tees and Stand-by Letters of Credit, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/id420/index.html.
Interestingly, the ISP98 and UCP 500 overlap; although the ISP applies to Standby Letters of
Credit, the UCP has been used for both Letters of Credit and Standby Letters of Credit. The
ICC adopted the ISP98 in 1998. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDBY
PRACTICES: ISP98 (ICC Publication No. 590, 1998); David J. Barru, How to Guarantee Con-
tractor Performance on International Construction Projects: Comparing Surety Bonds with
Bank Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 51, 68 (2005).
Some have predicted that UCP 600 will encourage the use of ISP98 for standby letters of
credit. CommercialLending Update, November (2006), http://www.aldrichandbonnefin.com/
documents/CommercialLending I 1-06.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2008).
250. See INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACTICES: ISP98,
supra note 249.
251. See Int'l Chamber of Commerce, Policy Statement: ICC Endorsement of the
UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees and Stand-By Letters of Credit Commis-
sion on Banking Technique and Practice, June 21, 1999, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
id420/index.html.
252. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 3, at 220.
Alvarez also gives the example of the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which
incorporates by reference "generally accepted" international "rules, standards, regu-
lations, procedures and/or practices" ... effectively transform[ing] a number cf
[International Maritime Organization] IMO's codes, guidelines, regulations, and
recommendations ... into binding norms, even for States that may not have ap-
proved of these standards within the context of the IMO but have been parties to the
Law of the Sea Convention.
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rural poverty by promoting sound agricultural policies in investment."3
In this project, the Bank endorses the FAO's Code of Conduct as part of
a plan to pursue investments in agriculture.5 4 Here, the Bank affirma-
tively links its efforts to conform national policy to these standards,
transforming these soft law rules into hard law obligations.
Alvarez explains the codification of the soft law of the FAO (as
well as other institutions) into hard law through the World Bank Guide-
lines, which Bank staff use when assessing various projects and
drafting loan agreements. 25' He argues, "The World Bank Guidelines,
no less than some treaties, are a mechanism to 'harden' a dense net-
work of otherwise 'soft law' norms or treaties whose terms are vague
or that have drawn few parties. 256 As Alvarez explains, the Bank's le-
gitimacy claim with respect to these guidelines rests more on process
values than representative values, as the Guidelines are not adopted
through a political process, but are often administratively adopted with
comment from various interested parties.257 But, when these Guidelines
are adopted within a particular loan agreement, they become binding,
at the very least as a matter of contract law.258
The WTO and Various Standard-Setting Organizations. Similar to
the World Bank's cross-referencing of the FAO, the WTO's SPS Agree-
ment cross-references and validates several standards set by lOs. WTO
Members who enact SPS measures that are based on the Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the
International Plant Protection Convention fall into a safe harbor within
the SPS. 259 WTO law thus links itself to these standards and accommo-
dates the values that they reflect.2 °
The WTO endorsements have transformed soft law into hard law.
The WTO invocation of the Codex Alimentarius, for example, has
taken a voluntary code concerning food safety and made it the safe
Id. at 220.
253. See World Bank, Sourcebook; Agricultural Investment, http://go.worldbank.org/
2REEL9SEZO (last visited Aug. 14, 2008).
254. See World Bank, Sourcebook; Agricultural Investment Module 4, http://
go.worldbank.org/Q8KF5EXO80 (last visited May 3, 2008).
255. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS, supra note 3, at
236-37.
256. Id. at 237.
257. Id. at 236.
258. Id.
259. SPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 3.4.
260. The Codex Alimentarius Commission is a subsidiary organization of the WHO and
the FAO. Codex Alimentarius, http://www.codexalimentarius.net (last visited Sept. 11, 2008).
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harbor provision under the SPS Agreement.26 ' By doing so, the WTO
has all but assured that countries will conform to that standard. This
has put new pressures on the Codex. 62 One commentator has ques-
tioned whether the input criteria that supported the Codex as a
voluntary code can support the Codex's new stature:
Inequities between the various participants are perhaps the
most important failing. In order for there to be true delibera-
tion, equality between participants is essential. There are a
number of important disparities between the parties in the Co-
dex process. First, developing countries are less able to
participate in Codex deliberations due to a lack of resources. In
addition, states have more power than non-state actors, limiting
the ability of interests that are not effectively represented by
states to be heard. Finally, within the non-state groups present
at the Codex, there is a bias towards industry groups, with
263
many fewer active consumer group participants.
Differences in participation rates between developed and developing
countries also lead to inequities in input 26 Nevertheless, the Codex has
been hardened into a standard that will apply to all WTO member coun-
tries alike.
4. Resource Sharing
Resource sharing includes sharing data and personnel. It may or
may not lead to global lawmaking. Nonetheless, the very act of work-
ing together signals that each 10 (and its norms) has legitimacy. In this
regard it is an implicit co-endorsement that allows the lOs-and the
norms that they generate-to claim greater legitimacy.
26The OECD and the WHO. The OECD both develops norms 65 and
promotes the legal norms developed by other organizations. 266 Not
surprisingly, the OECD works with development banks such as the
Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Inter-American
261. Michael A. Livermore, Note, Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance:
Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv.
766, 776 (2006) (discussing Member States' incentives to adopt the Codex).
262. Id. at 781 (discussing the pressure for legitimacy of the Codex, given its new posi-
tion in the international legal framework).
263. Id. at 783.
264. Id. (citing BRUCE TRAILL ET AL., REPORT OF THE EVALUATION OF THE CODEX
ALIMENTARIUS AND OTHER FAO AND WHO FOOD STANDARDS WORK (2002)).
265. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 1997 U.S.T. LEXIS 105, available at http:f/
www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,fr2649-34859_2017813-1-1_1-1,00.html.
266. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 146.
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Development Bank, but in 2005, it prioritized its relationship with the
WHO.167 The WHO/OECD alliance involves sharing data on health
statistics, mortality rates, and diseases in OECD member countries,
systemic terminology in health care and biotechnology, food safety,
and chemicals management. 6 OECD information and links are
provided on the WHO Health Evidence Network webpage, "which
gives rapid access to reliable health information and evidence."269
The WHO and the WTO. In 2002, the WHO and the WTO pub-
lished a joint study, The WTO Agreements & Public Health.20 The
report does more than share information. It details a list of linkages
between the activities, concerns, and norms of both regimes and identi-
fies areas in which the 1Os can share input and achieve coordination.27
This example shows that resource sharing can be part of a more in-
depth alliance, such as coordination or partnership.272
III. DERIVATIVE LEGITIMACY AND ITS BENEFITS AND COSTS
Achieving greater legitimacy through alliances, whether through
partnership, coordination, endorsement, or simple information and re-
source sharing, is both desirable and problematic. Although alliances
may create more legitimate laws, they may also lead to false legitimacy
claims. And, they may marginalize those who do not participate in the
alliances and can result in entrenchment. These alliances also offer new
regime and forum shifting strategies, which are factors to consider
when evaluating these norms. Finally, alliances may provide new op-
portunities for abuse or manipulation. In this part, I detail these
consequences. In Part IV, I suggest that good procedures will promote
more legitimate norms and mitigate negative consequences.
A. Legitimate Institutions and Norms
Properly managed, linkage and accommodation can enhance the
legitimacy of 1Os, alliances, and global lawmaking. 73 Alliances among
lOs can enable resulting norms to claim both output and input legiti-
macy criteria, even though either organization might lack one or the
267. OECD, Framework for Co-operation Between OECD and WHO, OECD Doc.
C(99) 196 (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/58/36545479.pdf.
268. Id.
269. See WHO, Health Evidence Network, http://www.euro.who.int/HEN (last visited
Aug. 14, 2008).
270. Joint Study, supra note 219.
271. Id. at 57-137.
272. See supra notes 208-213 and accompanying text.
273. See Cho, supra note 106, at 674.
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other. Alliances formed through linkage and accommodation might
also enable output and input legitimacy claims that might otherwise not
be possible because one or both of the 1Os has reached beyond its
original mandate. The very act of allying strengthens claims based on
inclusion and makes it more likely that the IOs will be effective.
Linkage and accommodation may enable an alliance to claim le-
gitimacy criteria lacking in one of the members of the alliance. For
example, an 1O partnership between a club model 10 and a representa-
tive one would be able to claim input legitimacy. Representation by
proxy provides at least some input legitimacy. 4 And, the very act of
partnership promotes inclusion. Likewise, if output legitimacy requires
effective functioning based on some normative yardstick, then it can be
helpful to broker consensus or ally with an already functioning effec-
tive institution.27 ' The World Bank/UNCITRAL partnership on
insolvency serves as an example. 6 UNCITRAL can make strong repre-
sentation and inclusion claims .2" And, although it develops some
remarkably successful instruments, others are less than successful.
278
The World Bank, however, although operating as a club, has a great
deal of success in effectively implementing norms.27' Thus, the World
Bank/UNCITRAL partnership on insolvency can claim input legiti-
macy and output legitimacy.
Linkage and accommodation strengthen legitimacy claims strained
by 10 evolution. Joost Pauwleyn notes that the WTO, for example, now
lacks both input and output legitimacy because its effectiveness in
trade liberalization has waned, and, although nominally representative,
it operates more as a club.280 Linkage and accommodation could help it
be more effective. They could also improve its inclusiveness. Thus,
even though the WTO has stalled in efforts to generate greater trade
liberalization, it has had some success in its alliance with the World
274. Keohane, Contingent Legitimacy, supra note 102, at 13 (discussing criteria for
comparative legitimacy and stating that "multilateralism per se ... confers legitimacy" be-
cause it is more inclusive).
275. Leebron, supra note 159, at 11-16 (discussing strategic linkage).
276. See supra notes 175-190 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
279. Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront Of World Transfor-
mation, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. 349 (1992) (noting that "[t]he World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund ... are major forces in promoting market-oriented policy reforms and reduc-
ing poverty in those countries making the transition to market economies"); Jeremy J.
Sanders, The World Bank and the IMF: Fostering Growth in the Global Market, 9 CURRENTS:
INT'L TRADE L.J. 37 (2000).
280. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 6, 35-36
(2005).
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Bank to embed its liberal trade values within developing countries.2 1'
The WTO endorsement of soft law standards, such as the Codex, has
furthered WTO harmonization efforts.282 Whether such success is desir-
able, it nevertheless gives the WTO a stronger claim to output
legitimacy. Coordination efforts could provide the WTO with an oppor-
tunity to strengthen input legitimacy, in particular, through
inclusiveness and process. For example, although the WTO has allowed
a number of organizations to be observers, 283 and it has coordinated
284
with others, it has resisted partnerships that might result in stronger
process or inclusion claims, such as a more in-depth alliance with the
ILO.
285
Law-making alliances may also enhance legitimacy by the very
process of allying, creating more innovation and more responsive ap-
proaches to difficult problems. Bringing together different
constituencies to work together in a new setting may generate new
thoughts, new perspectives, and more effective functioning. For exam-
ple, UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvency drew a panoply of
experts from different arenas to work on a difficult problem.286 It may
also reveal the benefits of participation, access, transparency, and gen-
erally the payoffs from typical administrative law tools. Such benefits
may spur more inclusion. As a result, participation may beget still more
• • - 287
participation.
The process of allying can also result in more holistic and efficient
efforts. Norm-generating alliances reduce duplication and avoid unnec-
281. See supra notes 228-241 and accompanying text.
282. Kelly, Power Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 121-23 (discussing
potential for the Codex as a safe harbor within the SPS).
283. International Intergovernmental Organizations Granted Observer Status to WTO
Bodies, http://www.wto.org/englishlthewtose/igo_obse.htm (last visited July 31, 2008).
284. The WTO website proclaims,
The WTO maintains extensive institutional relations with several other international
organizations; there are some 140 international organisations that have observer
status in WTO bodies. The WTO also participates as observer in the work of several
international organizations. In all, the WTO Secretariat maintains working relations
with almost 200 international organisations in activities ranging from statistics, re-
search, standard-setting, and technical assistance and training. Although the extent
of such cooperation varies, coordination and coherence between the work of the
WTO and that of other international organizations continues to evolve so as to assist
Members in the operation of their economic policies.
The WTO and Other Organizations, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/cohere/coher_
e.htm (last visited July 31, 2008).
285. The WTO and the International Labour Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtose/cohere/wto ilo-e.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2008).
286. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
287. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 17.
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essary inconsistencies. For example, in the area of international trade
law, there are a number of agencies working on related-or even the
same-issues. Informal collaboration is sometimes imperfect. Alli-
ances can improve cooperation and increase efficiencies. 29' The
Integrated Framework serves as an example of a multi-layered approach
292to a complicated problem that provides a number of efficiencies.
Despite the efficiencies that alliances create, linkage and accommo-
dation have their costs. In some instances, alliances undermine
legitimacy. Alliances can be used to solidify positions and to deflect calls
for greater transparency. For example, as discussed above, the coordina-
tion efforts between the WTO and the World Bank have resulted in an
Integrated Framework involving not only these organizations but also
UNCTAD, the IMF, and the UNDP2 93 The goal of the Integrated Frame-
work is to help developing countries with economic growth. A team of
experts evaluates a country's economic competitiveness and develops an
action plan.9 The Integrated Framework is a sensible, holistic approach
to development, and it would seem that the norms that result from Inte-
grated Framework recommendations and action plans would be entitled
to a significant amount of legitimacy. But not all voices are represented
in the Integrated Framework. The Integrated Framework lacks a sys-
temic labor or environmental partner.295 Although the ILO participates in
individual projects, it is not a partner to the Integrated Framework in the
same way as the IMF or the WTO.296 The ILO has been vigilant in trying
to be part of the policy discussions that underlie the Integrated Frame-
work.297 Omitting labor concerns or norms from an action plan for
development marginalizes those norms and can also undermine effec-
298tiveness.
288. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 300-01 (discussing the push for consisten-
cies among elemental regimes).
289. Wah-Teck Chan, supra note 142, para. 15.
290. Id.
291. Id. para. 16.
292. See supra notes 232-236 and accompanying text. Whether this effort has been suc-
cessful is a matter of debate. See McGill, supra note 237, at 399.
293. See Susan Prowse, Mega-Coherence: The Integrated Framework, in TRADE AND
AID: PARTNERS OR RIVALS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY? 85 (Sheila Paige ed., 2006).
294. Integrated Framework: Implementation: Diagnostic Phase, supra note 233.
295. See Prowse, supra note 293 at 83, 85.
296. Integrated Framework: Implementation: Diagnostic Phase, supra note 233.
297. The Impact of the ILO's Engagement with the .Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs) Process, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/
gb294/pdf/esp-5.pdf.
298. The failure to include a broader array of voices actually harmed the initial efforts of
the Integrated Framework. Susan Prowse reports that the Integrated Framework failed at the
country level, at least initially, because there was no country ownership beyond the trade min-
istries. See Prowse, supra note 293, at 83, 85.
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Ultimately, 1Os' alliances addressing difficult problems may lead to
more effective norms. By forming alliances, lOs collect more input,
more information, and more expertise to solve difficult problems.299 They
also garner a greater number of constituents invested in the final product
such that compliance becomes more likely, and, thus, the 10 may be
more effective." Ultimately, the legitimacy of these alliances will de-
pend on whether they are seen as effective and perceived as inclusive and
process oriented.30'
B. False Legitimacy Claims
While on the whole international norm-generating alliances are posi-
tive developments, one of their great dangers is that they cloak
themselves, or their constituent lOs, with undeserved derivative legiti-
macy. Not every alliance that makes a claim to greater legitimacy will be
entitled to it. The alliance may be one of name only, lacking substance.
In other words, States or civil society might perceive the alliance or the
constituents as having a greater claim to input or output legitimacy than
can be objectively justified.
False legitimacy claims may arise because the alliance uses the act
of allying to mask its deficiencies. The CPF is a good example of an alli-
ance that seems to claim more legitimacy than it should. Although it is
billed as an inclusive and representative organization, there have been
challenges to its representativeness. 2 Some claim that it has ghettoized
indigenous peoples and civil society.3 3 One can also question whether it
is in fact effective.3m Only recently has the UNFF, which the CPF sup-
ports, been able to move forward by producing a nonbinding
instrument.03 And, some have claimed that this instrument is not much
of a step forward."
Similarly, the coordination between the WTO and the WHO with re-
spect to the Framework Convention on Tobacco masks the normative
299. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 13-14 (discussing expert
authority and, in particular, UNCITRAL's incorporation of experts and other organizations in
formulating the Legislative Guide).
300. HURD, AFTER ANARCHY, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that legitimacy promotes
compliance); Heifer, Mediating, supra note 39, at 136 (noting that review by many organiza-
tions could produce better outcomes because it provides an opportunity for multiple responses
to policies, thus preventing any particular "organization from prematurely locking in an equi-
librium that is sub-optimal or biased toward particular interest groups").
301. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 16-17.
302. See FERN Special Report, supra note 196, at 2.
303. See UNFF Fails Indigenous Peoples Again, supra note 207.
304. See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
305. U.N. Forum on Forests, supra note 204.
306. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
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conflict between the two 1Os. In one way, the coordination that the WHO
invited with the WTO was essential. An FCTC that challenged the foun-
dational trading rules and the WTO would be seriously handicapped. 307
On the other hand, the Joint Report issued by the WHO and the WTO
does not seem to resolve any of the potential normative conflicts be-
tween the organizations.0 8 Any claim by either institution that it is more
legitimate as a result of the coordination does not seem warranted? °
False legitimacy claims are the most pernicious problem for deriva-
tive legitimacy because they obscure the underlying failures of the
alliance and its members. False legitimacy claims mask failure, thus not
only failing to correct an 10's deficiency (the lack of input criteria for
example), but also obscuring that failure, rendering it less likely to be
addressed in the future.
C. Marginalization
Alliances marginalize those not included in the alliance. Elsewhere I
have raised the possibility that accommodation, although desirable in
some respects, might obscure real debate over substantive normative dif-
ferences."O As Barnett and Finnemore point out, "lOs promote a
particular, mostly liberal, moral vision in world politics, and determining
this moral vision is itself an act of power in the most fundamental
sense."3 ' These alliances may strengthen the resulting lOs and their in-
fluence on States. Now, perhaps that is the point. But, views that are
external to these lOs may not find a forum.
UNCITRAL, for example, was established in part to provide a forum
for developing countries to participate in the harmonization of interna-
tional trade law.3 2 But as UNCITRAL forms alliances with other
organizations, those organizations obtain influence in UNCITRAL's
307. See Joseph N. Eckhardt, Balancing Interests in Free Trade and Health: How the
WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Can Withstand WTO Scrutiny, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 197, 199 (2002); see also Timothy J. Miano, Understanding And Applying
International Infectious Disease Law: U.N. Regulations During An H5nl Avian Flu Epidemic,
6 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 26, 43 (2006) (discussing infectious disease regulation).
308. Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion, supra note 223, at 1201-02 (discussing the negotia-
tions between the WHO and the WTO). Alternatively, false legitimacy claims may stem from a
nominal integration of one of the 1Os rather than a substantive one.
309. Raustiala and Victor note how in regime complexes, negotiators will attempt to
avoid conflicts by "demarcating clear boundaries" and negotiating "savings clauses." Raustiala
& Victor, supra note 128, at 297.
310. See Kelly, Power Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 113-27 (discuss-
ing potential conflict between the Cartagena Protocol and the SPS); accord Cho, supra note
106, at 639 (discussing the tension between trade and social regulation).
311. BARNETT & FINNEMORE, supra note 118, at 165 (discussing Sen's criticisms that
institutionalizing may silence most of the world's population).
312. Wah-Teck Chan, supra note 142, para. 7.
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norm-setting agenda and process. Such influence is not an evil in itself-it
is exactly what is desired by the alliance.3 3 That influence raises the
question of whether other voices-voices that may otherwise be un- or
underrepresented-are marginalized by the alliance.3 4 The failure of the
Integrated Framework to include labor interests in a meaningful way
exemplifies the problem of marginalization."3
Linkage and accommodation can also blunt the force of counter-
regime norms that regime and forum shifting promotes. Others have
written about regime shifting strategies and their potential for generating
counter-regime norms.36 Linkage and accommodation dilute norms and
undermine the creation of counter-regime norms.37 David Leebron, for
example, has discussed how linkages between regimes may dilute the
normative framework of the regimes," ' and the danger that one regime's
policies will overshadow another's.3 9 As discussed below, the CPF is an
interesting example of forum shifting that has pushed non-state actors
out of forest negotiations, even though it was those same actors whose
call for action created the CPF in the first place.2
The dilution of counter-regime norms is compounded by the
strengthening of alliance-supported norms. The convergence of multiple
1Os in the same issue area strengthens the power of the norms that result.
Michael Barr and Geoffrey Miller document what they call "nested re-
gimes" in assessing the legitimacy of the Basel Banking Committee:
The process of accession to the WTO financial services agree-
ment and concomitant efforts to ensure liberalization under the
agreement, resolution of currency and debt crises, IMF and
World Bank policy prescriptions and lending conditions, all in-
teract with Basel adoption in the developing world. The Basel
standards, while voluntary in principle, are effectively embedded
in a range of other policies and market practices that make adop-
tion in some form or another difficult to resist for developing
313. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 10.
314. Developing countries may feel market pressures to adopt a standard that they had
little say in developing. See Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 17 (discussing market pressure to
adopt Basel Banking Committee guidelines).
315. See supra Part II.B.
316. Heifer, Mediating, supra note 39, at 127-29.
317. Kelly, Power Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 127-28 (concluding
on the necessity of evaluating accommodation models because of their propensity to produce
undesirable effects).
318. Leebron, supra note 159, at 25 (giving an example of the possibility of including
labor rights within the trade regime).
319. Id. at 25-26. Leebron also suggests that "linkage will sometimes create an addi-
tional source of regime instability [because] ... it may be that no regime can be stronger or
more stable than the least stable of those regimes." Id. at 26.
320. See infra notes 322-346 and accompanying text.
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nations. Because these other policy and market regimes give
added force to the Basel Committee's hortatory pronounce-
ments, the extent and nature of global administrative law
mechanisms designed to enhance the legitimacy and account-
ability of the Basel Committee's processes need to take account
of these extra-Basel inputs.32'
Thus, alliances that promote efficiencies and increase leverage are more
likely to succeed in implementing their norms. They are also more likely
to succeed in marginalizing views that are inconsistent with those
322
norms.
Finally, marginalization results from unification and harmonization.
Some voices get pushed out.3 23 Brokered consensus may involve replac-
ing accountability with efficiency or expertise. 24 For example, one
commentator has suggested that although the Codex is relatively good
about participation from non-state interests, the interest of consumer
groups "to be effectively heard in consultations with national delegations
to the Codex may be impaired by a lack of domestic political influ-
ence."'325 Business groups have much greater access.326 Such disparate
treatment may be unavoidable. Nevertheless, the WTO/SPS endorsement
of the Codex and the resulting conversion of the Codex from soft to hard
law magnifies the importance of that marginalization.3" Arguably, such
marginalization is an unavoidable by-product of harmonization. That is
the whole point of harmonization, i.e., pushing out the non-conforming.
But, marginalization is a cost to be considered, and it is more likely to
result from alliances that involve club-like lOs and lack procedural
mechanisms to include non-members in the law-making process.
D. Entrenchment
Related to the problem of marginalization is the problem of en-
trenchment. Entrenchment results in frozen rules that are unresponsive to
changed circumstances or norms. Alliances bring more parties togetherin support of a particular norm. As more invest in that norm or rule, it
321. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 41.
322. Id. at 20 (discussing "lock-in" created by harmonization).
323. Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 752-53 (1998).
324. Id.
325. Livermore, supra note 261, at 785.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 781-83.
328. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1530 (2002); McGarity, supra note 97, at 1385-96.
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may become more difficult to have that norm or rule change or evolve.3 9
States reconstruct their interests through participation in these 1Os and
the alliances that they form.330 Once actors invest in 1Os, there is always
a danger that the law will become unresponsive and immutable33" ' and,
ultimately, less effective.332
One can see the relationship between marginalization and entrench-
ment by again turning to the Codex. The SPS/WTO endorsement of the
Codex causes national regulators to hold more closely to their pre-
established domestic preferences in Codex negotiations, fearing that
whichever standard is adopted will become the de facto world standard
by virtue of the WTO/SPS endorsement. As Michael Livermore points
out, such reticence cuts off serious deliberation and debate.33
As discussed above, alliances solidify positions and render law-
making institutions less open to new voices, new ideas, and new norms.
1Os and alliances, or networks of 1Os, are just as susceptible to en-
trenchment as national agencies or legislatures. While coordination
between the World Bank and the WTO may produce efficiencies, it also
entrenches the liberal trade values that those institutions espouse.336 En-
trenchment, like marginalization, may be unavoidable. But, unlike
marginalization, it really is not the point of harmonization, and therefore
is all the more problematic.
E. Regime and Forum Shifting Strategies
Regime and forum shifting involves "an attempt to alter the status
quo ante by moving treaty negotiations, law-making initiatives, or stan-
dard-setting activities from one international venue to another."
37
Regime and forum shifting, in my view, are neither good nor bad; they
329. For a discussion of harmonization and public choice critics of the Basel process, see
Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 20.
330. See Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, supra note 46, at 338.
331. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 296 (noting path dependence in regime com-
plexes at the meso scale).
332. Cf Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 26.
333. Livermore, supra note 261, at 786.
334. Id. at 786-87.
335. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring The Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Gov-
ernance through Global Government Networks: A New World Order, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255,
1276 (2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004)) ("National
governments, international agencies, and large corporations are all subject to bureaucratic
ossification... ").
336. Pablo Zapatero, Searching for Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, 24
PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 595, 622-24 (2006) (discussing how the partnering of the WTO, the
IMF, and the World Bank has furthered their goal of trade liberalization, but at the same time
has discriminated against the economic policies of other institutions that "inevitably produce a
particularly restricted phenomenon of path dependence in their activities").
337. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 247, at 53.
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are strategies that can be put to different purposes. Actors engage in re-
gime or forum shifting as a strategy to affect 10 agendas and
functioning.338 They also tend to forum shop to best suit their own inter-
ests when initiating a change in the rules.339 Alliances formed through
linkage and accommodation in order to facilitate lawmaking open new
pathways to regime shifting.340
These new alliances provide a new forum to which to shift. It might
be a new venue in which to promote counter-regime norms. 4' So, for
example, it may be possible for labor rights advocates to insinuate them-
selves into World Bank agendas on development with the World Bank
342alliances. However, alliances may also operate to thwart regime or fo-
rum shifting attempts. Because these alliances broker consensus, they
may force participants to compromise and close out dissent.4 3 Likewise,
where the WHO accommodates trade concerns, those who would want
to use trade devices to promote health concerns are shut out.
One can imagine the situation in which alliances are formed in order
to displace the jurisdiction of other law-creating 1Os. The CPF provides
an interesting example of forum shifting and partnerships. It was after
the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 that civil society and indigenous peoples
petitioned the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) to
take up forest issues that went unimplemented after Rio). The result, as
discussed above, was the IPF and then the IFF, both of which begat the
IAF and the resulting UNFF and the CPF.343 Some claim that the CPF
and the UNFF have ghettoized civil society and indigenous peoples and
relegated their views as far inferior to States' positions on forests.3 0 State
control of the UNFF process has muted the concerns of non-state stake-
holders in this new forum, even though it was these stakeholders that
instigated the creation of the forum in the first place.347
338. Id.
339. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 299.
340. Helfer, Regime Shifting, supra note 247, at 16-17 (discussing how less rigid regime
boundaries lead to the creation of "multi-issue, multi-venue mega-regime[s]" in which partici-
pants may shift negotiations to venues more suited to their interests).
341. Helfer, Mediating, supra note 39, at 127-29.
342. See ILO, ILO Relations with Bretton Woods Institutions, supra note 239.
343. Kelly, Power Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 113 (noting that
"[u]nfortunately, concealing the differences among regimes may be detrimental to the interests
embodied in the less powerful regime and indeed may force the less powerful regime to ap-
pease the more powerful regime's interests").
344. Forest Peoples Programme, supra note 193.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
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F. The Potential for Abuse
Alliances offer creative parties an opportunity to abuse the process
that creates the alliances. Abuses may come in the form of manipulation
or capture, placing one stakeholder's agenda, or the agenda of a set of
stakeholders, over another's. Capture also can lead to other problems
already discussed, including marginalization, entrenchment, and false
claims of legitimacy.
Much as a national administrative agency is subject to capture,348 the
alliances themselves can become tools that the alliance members utilize
in order to obtain their policy objectives. 349 The WHO process of inclu-
sion and coordination reveals a compelling example. The tobacco
industry took advantage of the WHO philosophy of inclusion to under-
mine its efforts to curb tobacco use. 5" In addition to lobbying and public
relations efforts to discredit the WHO and change its agenda, the tobacco
industry cultivated relationships with WHO staff and employees, some-
times offering them future employment. 35 ' The industry also tried to use
its financial and political power to influence WHO budgets.352 The WHO
report documenting this abuse deals with tobacco industry actions di-
rected at the WHO generally.353 But, one can see how these tactics could
easily be applied to an alliance. Alliances provide multiple points of en-
try for those wishing to capture an agenda.3
Alliances that involve club organizations may be more subject to
capture. Club-like organizations can be nontransparent, and, thus, more
348. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 98, at 169.
349. Allyn Lise Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal Frame-
work for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 339 (1992)
(noting that "[public international] organizations are also subject to significant external influ-
ence from individuals, nations, non-governmental organizations, and other international
organizations"); see also Raustiala & Victor, supra note 128, at 301-02 (noting the potential
for abuse). Raustiala and Victor state,
While efforts at achieving consistency drive much of the action within a regime
complex, the PGR case illustrates that States may also attempt to create what we
term strategic inconsistency. Cognizant that the growing legalization of world poli-
tics means that legal conflicts focus efforts at solutions, States at times attempt to
force change by explicitly crafting rules in one elemental regime that are incom-
patible with those of another.
Id.
350. Tobacco Company Strategies, supra note 227.
351. Id. at 32.
352. Id. at 37.
353. Id.
354. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 247, at 8-9 (explaining that linkages create a
need for international bodies to manage complex policy issues, which leads to regime shifting
and creates considerable room for groups of States and NGOs to maneuver so as to maximize
their own interests).
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subject to efforts to capture .3 " Barr and Miller give the Basel Committee
as an example of a club organization that is particularly vulnerable to
capture. Where alliances exercise leverage to secure implementation,
the problem of capture and "regulatory imperialism ' 357 is particularly
acute. Thus, for example, the coordination between the WTO and the
World Bank leaves little room for non-liberal trade norms. Wealthy
countries develop the trading rules, and wealthy countries can impose
them through the World Bank.35 Regardless of whether they are good
rules, developing countries may have little choice but to accept them.359
Weaker groups, as opposed to States, might be pushed aside as well.
Business groups, for example, may have more access than consumer
groups to alliances and international organizations. 360 Alliances com-
pound the access problem because they reduce transparency and increase
the power of the underlying organizations.
IV. EVALUATING DERIVATIVE LEGITIMACY CLAIMS
THROUGH INPUT (PROCESS) CRITERIA
Where an alliance maintains good procedures, it will be more likely
that its derivative legitimacy claims will be objectively warranted.3 61 De-
rivative legitimacy results from the relationship between the 1Os. That
relationship may or may not foster more legitimacy. The relationship
may cause the alliance to have mixed, contentious, or simply blurred
objectives, making effectiveness an illusive measure. Or, the alliance
may compound the problems of representation and inclusion. Process
addresses these issues by promoting accountability and transparency.62
Good process ensures that the relationship is meaningful, open, and
fruitful.363 Although process does not solve all problems (and indeed it
355. See, e.g., Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 19 (discussing the Basel Committee).
356. Id. at 19-20 (noting criticisms of the Basel Committee).
357. Id. at 20 (stating that "[m]ost powerful economic nations meet to develop rules that
will affect a broad range of countries excluded from the process of developing the rules").
358. See supra notes 228-235 and accompanying text.
359. See Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 20.
360. Stewart, supra note 7, at 87.
361. The process criteria discussed here can be situated in the larger global administra-
tive law project. See, e.g., id. at 74-75.
362. Esty, supra note 46, at 1522 (discussing how process can give structure to policy-
making, further accountability, and encourage dialogue, thereby enhancing legitimacy and
effectiveness).
363. Id. at 1521 (noting that "[a] thoughtfully structured rulemaking process will clarify
underlying issues, bring facts to bear, promote careful analysis of policy options, and engage
interested parties in a political dialogue").
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creates some), 6 it best supports strong legitimacy claims for law-making
alliances. Moreover, process is better suited than other metrics because it
can alleviate some of the particular dangers raised in these alliances.
A. How Good Procedures Strengthen Derivative Legitimacy Claims
Even if one might have adopted a particular output or input frame-
work for assessing the legitimacy claims of 1Os, it is not clear that such a
framework would necessarily be suitable to objectively assess derivative
legitimacy claims spawned by these alliances. A derivative legitimacy
claim should be assessed by examining the relationship of the members
because it is from that relationship that legitimacy derives. When exam-
ining that relationship, we should assess whether it employs good
procedures in order to evaluate whether its legitimacy claims are objec-
tively justified. Process promotes the substantive exchange of ideas,
facilitates accountability and transparency, ameliorates negative external-
ities of alliances, and can be tailored for each particular alliance.
A process analysis best suits derivation legitimacy claims because it
reveals the workings of the relationship. We can see the exchange of
views and whether inclusion is undercut by the exclusion of others or
whether it was designed to shift debate to an ineffective path. Process
can reveal whether the relationship entrenches the parties and creates
path-dependence, resulting in less effectiveness. The ideal procedure
needed will depend on the alliance, but a suitable derivative legitimacy
framework uses procedure to ensure an open and effective relationship
between the 1Os. More specifically, when thinking about the most suit-
able derivative legitimacy framework, we should consider the typology
of alliances and the potential relational queries that each raises.
1. Partnering
Where partnering means a real dialogue concerning various alterna-
tives and the norms that they represent, crediting the resulting norms
with the other lOs' input legitimacy seems genuine. In such cases, it
seems more likely that the dialogue will lead to the most effective alter-
natives available. The partnership between UNCITRAL and the World
Bank in drafting the Guide seemed to involve a real airing of views and
365an attempt to represent a wide variety of interests.
364. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 68 (explaining how transparency can increase costs
and impede successful negotiations).
365. See supra notes 175-193 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even this partner-
ship can be criticized because it resulted in a hybrid document, which some might claim
avoided the truly difficult questions.
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However, it may be that "partnerships" are merely nominal entities.
One could question, for example, the work of the Collaborative Partner-
ship on Forests. Although, this alliance claims to be a partnership and
claims input legitimacy in terms of inclusion and representation, argua-
bly it is not really inclusive or representative;6 its legitimacy claims are
false. One can distinguish such false claims from deserved claims by
examining whether the alliance employs good procedures. For example,
where alliances have procedures to allow transparency, interested parties
can see if the partnership is working. A meaningful exchange of ideas
through notice and comment or other participatory mechanisms should
result in more effective rules.3 67 Power-sharing procedures minimize ma-
nipulation and capture opportunities.
Additionally, nominal partnerships have serious costs. They actually
undermine legitimacy claims because they push out marginal voices or
entrench the status quo. Worse, partnerships may enable interested par-
ties to shift debate of the normative issues to a forum or a regime in
which outcomes can be manipulated . Participation and transparency
mechanisms reduce the likelihood of manipulation by eliciting debate
and increasing accountability. 369 Rules for explanation should minimize
opportunities for abuse as well.
2. Coordination
Coordination suggests three possible scenarios, each aided by good
procedures. First, institutions may coordinate their law-making activities
so that different experts work on separate segments of a problem.
UNCITRAL, for example, holds itself out as the coordinating 10 in the
area of international trade law.70 Here, coordinating substantive work
reduces duplication and leads to greater effectiveness.37' One would want
to be certain that the alliance chose the best means of dividing work to
promote effectiveness. Participatory mechanisms will generate more al-
ternatives and debate concerning the appropriate division of labor.
72
Although each organization might be an expert in the area, and thus
might have its own ideas about how to divide work, the fact that they are
366. See supra notes 191-207 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 94.
368. See supra notes 344-346 and accompanying text.
369. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 28-29; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 12.
370. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 29-48.
371. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking,
32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 851, 844-86 (2007) [hereinafter Block-Lieb & Halliday, Incremental-
isms] (explaining that many of UNCITRAL's law-making accomplishments stem from its
usage of "pyramidal incrementalism" in partnering with other organizations and building on
their prior work).
372. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 26-27.
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working together suggests that none of the organizations is suited to do
the job alone.373 Therefore, it is more likely that their efforts will be ef-
fective if they have power-sharing procedures.
Second, the coordination effort might be an attempt to try to work
together in overlapping areas of expertise. So, where the ILO attempts to
coordinate its labor reform efforts with the Bretton Woods Institutions'
efforts on economic development, 74 one can see an opportunity for
greater inclusion.375 One would want to ensure that the inclusive oppor-
tunities were real, through transparency and participatory mechanisms.
Third, coordination might result in a shared understanding that the
resulting law will not conflict with the values or already established laws
of either of the lOs. This "hands off' coordination is troubling, as it sug-
gests that parties represented by counter-regime norms are cut out of the
process of norm development.376 If, for example, the WHO had carved
out language in its FCTC to appease the WTO agreements,377 those who
see trade measures as an acceptable tool to combat the spread of tobacco
use would be shut out of a forum (the WHO). Transparency is particu-
larly important here as it reveals the normative compromise to those that
would wish to challenge it and enables accountability.3 78 Participation
mechanisms would be important as well because they would provide
some outlet for those values pushed out by accommodation.
Some coordination efforts will be difficult to evaluate. The WTO and
the World Bank support each other's values of liberal trade in support of
economic development.379 In one sense, this alliance produces efficien-
cies. Working together, these organizations achieve leverage in their
liberal trade agenda.8 ° Pablo Zapotero observes:
The modern institutional architecture of global governance is
comprised of a group of coexisting and interrelated international
regimes, such as international institutions and treaties with a de-
gree of institutionalization. These regimes consolidate horizontal
373. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Incrementalisms, supra note 371, at 900-02 (explaining
that various incrementalisms are necessary to facilitate global consensus, which could suggest
that within a given area of global lawmaking there exists an inherent division of labor and that
some organizations are better suited to certain functions).
374. See supra notes 239-244 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 241-244 and accompanying text.
376. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 123 (stating that
implicit deference is especially troublesome because it "masks ... normative differences and
allows norms to evolve in a skewed fashion").
377. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
378. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 31.
379. Zapatero, supra note 336, at 596-97 (discussing synergies among rules and policies
of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank with regards to trade liberalization for purposes of
international growth and development).
380. Id.
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networks of inter-institutional relations on diverse stages of de-
velopment. The mechanism of coordination between the
International Monetary Fund ... the World Bank, and the
World Trade Organization ... stands out among them. This
three-sided model of coordination promotes the convergence of
agendas and activities in the areas of trade integration, develop-
ment, and macroeconomic stability.38" '
Thus, coordination may help to promote the trading rules even in the
face of opposition to those rules.382 At the same time, this mutually rein-
forcing coordination empowers the constituent 1Os and the norms they
develop without necessarily including more views.383 However, such co-
ordination may lead to greater effectiveness and thus warrant more
legitimacy from an output legitimacy perspective. Input credentials
would benefit from process and the inclusive mechanisms that process
generates.
3. Endorsements
An endorsement typically involves one institution promoting the
rules or standards of an expert institution. Endorsements bestow legiti-
macy on both the endorsing and the endorsed institution. The endorsing
institution claims the authority to pronounce another 10's norms, rules,
or standards as useful, and the endorsed 1O enjoys validation of its work
product. So, both UNCITRAL and the ICC benefit from UNCITRAL's
endorsement of the UCP 500." UNCITRAL tells the world that the ICC
has a great product, while at the same time proclaiming itself as the arbi-
ter of great products."5 In one sense, endorsements seem ideal. One can
imagine a representative institution seeking the endorsement of an expert
technical law-creating body.
However, endorsements may lead to false legitimacy where the rules
or standards of one institution are codified without any real considera-
tion of whether they are consistent with the interests of those represented
by the endorsing institution.386 Here, an endorsement would seem more
legitimate if it resulted from a meaningful examination of the norms,
laws, or standards endorsed. Process helps ensure that the examination is
meaningful. For example, as Alvarez explains, when the World Bank
381. Id. at 595.
382. See, e.g., Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 121.
383. Id.
384. UNCITRAL, 33rd Session, supra note 249, para. 434 (congratulating the ICC on its
work and noting that the UNCITRAL endorsement is a function within the Commission's
mandate).
385. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 27, at 2.
386. See Livermore, supra note 261, at 786-87.
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Guidelines codified the FAO standards, the Bank relied on process, using
participatory mechanisms to garner legitimacy."7
4. Resource Sharing
Information and resource sharing is helpful but should not be touted
beyond its true worth. Sharing information allows for more effective
norms. The more an institution knows, the better that it can address a
problem. And, to be sure, information sharing can be a way of making an
10 more inclusive and more effective. But, information alone does not
assure that interests are represented or that values are considered. Like-
wise, access to information does not guarantee positive outcomes. So,
while information sharing is to be applauded, alliances that proclaim
legitimacy based on information sharing should face meaningful exami-
nation. For example, the ILO and the WTO have recently concluded an
important report, Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy Re-
search,"' which compiles a host of information on the economic links
between labor and trade and is certain to be very useful to policymakers.
But, it does not integrate the ILO into the Integrated Framework as the
ILO might like.389
B. Process as Compared to Other Metrics
Process criteria are a superior metric to other legitimacy criteria for
assessing derivative legitimacy claims. Any output metric used to test
these alliances necessarily involves a normative assumption, an inescap-
able assumption for output criteria. True, output criteria are always
subject to criticism for their normative assumptions. But, this criticism
takes on special salience where alliances are involved. Linkage and ac-
commodation mask normative struggles,39° obscuring output criteria's
normative assumptions. Take, for example, the derivative legitimacy of
the UNCITRAL/World Bank collaboration on the Legislative Guide. On
the one hand, the Guide represents a stunning accomplishment.3 91 It em-
ploys new technologies to address a difficult challenge to harmonization
of fundamental differences in domestic insolvency laws. 9 Yet, one could
complain that by brushing over the hard questions with these technolo-
387. See ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS, supra note 3, at
236-37; supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text.
388. INT'L LABOUR OFFICE & WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: CHAL-
LENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH (2007).
389. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
390. Kelly, Power, Linkage and Accommodation, supra note 162, at 120.
391. Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 5.
392. Id. at 4-5.
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gies, the drafters have avoided the real conflicts 393 Thus, the Guide's ef-
fectiveness depends on its goals. If one concludes that UNCITRAL's
mandate is to harmonize,3 94 then the Guide did not achieve that goal. If
one believes that the UNCITRAL partnership with the World Bank was
meant to modernize insolvency law so that it may ultimately at some
later point lead to harmonization, then perhaps the Guide is effective.3 95
Thus, we see that where alliances leave open questions concerning goals,
any output metric will be inadequate because of subjective disagree-
ments over what is effective.
Still, one could accept the normative assumption, despite the danger
of ignoring difficult normative questions, and ask whether the alliance is
effective in terms of fulfilling the mandate it sets for itself. However,
given the particular problems raised by alliances discussed above, I
submit that using output criteria to judge these derivative legitimacy
claims is a second-best solution. The proliferation of these alliances and
the power that they have to affect every part of our lives demands more
rigorous review than assessing whether the alliance has achieved a self-
defined and somewhat self-serving objective.
Likewise, representation criteria falter because of the lack of interna-
396tional demos. Again, this is not a new criticism, but it is magnified by
alliances. It is difficult enough to apply a representation framework to
10s;39' the failure of the democratic analogy is compounded where IOs
team up to create law. For example, although most States are WTO
members, the WTO is not considered a truly representative organiza-
tion.398 It really falls into the club model.3 99 The Codex also lacks
equitable representation among States .4o Although it is a U.N. agency
(located within the FAO), different countries have different abilities to
participate in developing the norms established there.n°' Thus, although
393. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Harmonization and Moderniza-
tion in UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 42 TEX. INT'L L.J. 475, 508-09
(2007) [hereinafter Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization] (discussing
the Guide's ability to deal with and sidestep some difficult issues).
394. G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), supra note 26, 8.
395. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note
393, at 512.
396. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 11 (describing the lack of a political community).
397. See, e.g., Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 26 (noting the high cost of public partici-
pation in international lawmaking).
398. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 20 (explaining that while WTO delegates claim
accountability, their negotiations are often shrouded in secrecy, leaving outsiders with the
feeling that they are not adequately represented).
399. Id. at 7-8 (describing the WTO as a "club of trade ministers" and its negotiations as
"clublike").
400. Livermore, supra note 261, at 783 (citing TRAILL ET AL., supra note 264).
401. Id.
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both the WTO and the Codex "represent" the interest of a majority of
States, it would be difficult to say whether the WTO endorsement of the
Codex was entitled to a claim of input legitimacy based on representa-
402tion.
Inclusion as a paradigm is helpful but incomplete. Inclusion criteria
promote dialogue, transparency, and more representative norms. But,
inclusion, like representation, does not necessarily promote effective
norms. In my view, process facilitates inclusion and serves additional
purposes that promote fairness, order, predictability, transparency, and
accountability. Process can at least tell us if the alliances allow for repre-
sentative values. But, it can also elicit debate, lead to more effective
results, and contribute to accountability.
403
Process is also a superior metric because it can be tailored. The par-
ticular procedures needed to objectively assess derivative legitimacy
claims will depend on the organizations and issues involved.40 For ex-
ample, where a partnership such as the WTO and the World Bank forms,
the concerns relate more to marginalization and entrenchment rather than
to false legitimacy claims.4 5 Thus, transparency and participatory proc-
ess mechanisms are more important. Likewise, alliances that claim to be
partnerships should have procedures in place that enable power sharing
and should be transparent so that interested parties can see the true na-
ture of the partnership. While endorsements may involve one body
adopting the work product of a more expert body, any lack of public par-
ticipation in the operations of the latter should be countered by
participatory mechanisms and transparency. The procedures best suited
for coordination alliances will depend on the particular method of coor-
dination. For example, an alliance that divides work will need different
procedures than one that accommodates values by avoiding conflicts. I
will not attempt to prescribe procedures for every type of alliance here; I
will just argue that procedural choices will need to be tailored.
C. How Good Procedures Mitigate Problems
Caused by Law-Making Alliances
I submit that the best means to assess the derivative legitimacy
claims of these alliances is to examine whether the alliances employ pro-
cedural devices to increase participation, dialogue, transparency,
accountability, and integrity. These procedures promote more legitimate
norms, but they also mitigate the particular problems that law-making
402. See Levit, supra note 67, at 200-01 (discussing the accountability "mismatch").
403. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 28-29.
404. Id. at 17.
405. See supra notes 321, 335-338 and accompanying text.
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alliances cause, including false legitimacy claims, marginalization, en-
trenchment, harmful regime and forum shifting opportunities, and abuse.
False legitimacy claims proffer shared information, partnership, or co-
ordination as grounds for greater legitimacy, but examination of the actual
alliance fails to reveal any positive benefit from the proffered relationship.
The CPF could be accused of this."" Transparency mechanisms allow in-
terested parties to see the false claim objectively and not credit the claim.
Participation avenues will also be helpful, as they can be useful in holding
ineffective alliances accountable. Alliances that marginalize or push out
other voices that might offer real criticism or prodding can be held ac-
countable if there are procedures to allow such criticism and participation.
Process also thwarts false legitimacy claims because it promotes ef-
fectiveness more generally. Notice and comment procedures not only
allow stakeholders an expressive outlet, they promote debate that fosters
more effective rules.4' 7 In fact, process criteria such as notice and com-
ment provisions, power-sharing devices, transparency, controls against
corruption, and explanatory requirements all elicit debate and hopefully,
but not necessarily, better rules. Through transparency, interested parties
can see what is being done and at least try to intervene should they find
it objectionable or irrational.40'8 Power-sharing devices force those in
power to share their ideas in order to persuade each other. Debate leads
to better solutions.4 0 For example, the partnership between the World
Bank and UNCITRAL on the Guide allowed UNCITRAL to develop
new technologies in its law harmonization and modernization efforts."'
Arguably, the project would not have been successful without these
technologies.4 " Also, rules generated with adequate process will be more
406. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
407. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 24-27; see also Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down
Task Force v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that notice
and comment improve agency rulemaking by putting rules to the test of public commentary);
Am. Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that notice and
comment requirements "infuse[] the administrative process with [a] degree of openness, ex-
planation, and participatory democracy"); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 704 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (stating that comments educate the agency before rules with substantial impact are
enacted).
408. See Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 24 (noting that transparency provides for ac-
countability).
409. Esty, supra note 46, at 1520 (discussing deliberative legitimacy and asserting that it
"promote[s] rationality and improve[s] outcomes").
410. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining new tech-
nologies and rule-types).
411. See id. at 5-6 (suggesting that the new technologies and rule-types facilitated the
success of the Guide).
Summer 20081
Michigan Journal of International Law
likely to secure compliance-because of their input legitimacy creden-
tials-and, thus, be more effective.4"2
Arguably, process and inclusion can frustrate efforts to generate use-
• 411
ful norms in the first place. Club organizations work, in part, because
• 414
through exclusion and secrecy they reach decisions and take action.
However, I do not believe that this argument defeats a push for more
procedures in law-making alliances because these alliances by their very
existence suggest that the 1Os need to reach out to other 1Os in order to
be effective. They have already sacrificed some exclusivity and secrecy,
and if we wish to credit them with derivative legitimacy, we should be
able to see that they are actually entitled to it.
Process also alleviates negative consequences caused by alliances.
As discussed above, harmonization and convergence necessarily lead to
some marginalization but process can at least minimize the marginali-
zation that results from excluding others from the debate4 6 Voices that
lose the debate will, of course, be marginalized, but participatory proce-
dures, power-sharing, transparency, and explanation enable those voices
to at least be heard once.
The debate and dialogue facilitated by process wards off entrench-
ment. Decision-makers may become entrenched and path-dependent,
choosing only to perpetuate the status quo.4 7 Procedural safeguards and
their resultant transparency and dialogue allow interested parties to ex-
amine the causes, and to combat the effects, of entrenchment.48
Process has its problems. Although I argue that process can alleviate
entrenchment, process can, admittedly, create entrenchment through os-
sification. Procedural rules can frustrate attempts at reform and make the
law less responsive 9  Process can also be biased in favor of well-
organized and well-funded stakeholders.4 '20 But, I am not suggesting that
we adopt process for process' sake. The process needed must be tailored
to each alliance. Sometimes transparency will be more important than
notice and comment procedures. Moreover, ossification results from de-
412. Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and
Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520, 573-75 (1977) (noting that "[tihe public may be
more likely to accept and less likely to sabotage a rule if it has been allowed to participate in
its formulation").
413. Stewart, supra note 7, at 68 (explaining, for example, how transparency can in-
crease costs and impede successful negotiations).
414. Levit, supra note 67, at 194 (discussing decision-making in small groups).
415. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
416. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 87.
417. See Zaring, supra note 3 1, at 578-79.
418. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 83-84.
419. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
420. Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 26.
421. See supra notes 404-405 and accompanying text.
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manding analytical review, rather than particularly procedural devices
that ensure transparency and notice. While I would argue that good proc-
ess requires that decision-makers give reasons, the international setting
lacks the type of analytical review present in national administrative
schemes in which ossification occurs.
Nevertheless, some baseline explanatory requirement spurs dialogue411
and debate and combats path-dependence. It is not a rational explanation
to say that something has always been done one way and thus must con-
tinue in the same way. Moreover, process begets process. 23 Imbuing an
organization with a culture of process, openness, and dialogue is perhaps
the most important guard against entrenchment.
Procedures that provide for transparency and combat corruption also
424
serve to minimize capture opportunities. Various 10 alliances consoli-
425date power and raise concerns regarding the abuse of that power.
Efforts at both regime shifting and forum shifting respond, in part, to
perceived power balances. 426 Transparency and anti-corruption proce-
dures reveal the workings of alliances and minimize incentive to41i 421
succumb to capture. 27 Admittedly, process can be abused. It can be
used to delay and derail.429 The choice to employ procedures involves a
cost-benefit analysis. Process may slow down international law-making
alliances, but the benefits are that they develop more legitimate norms.
CONCLUSION
Law-making alliances among lOs are ubiquitous, useful, and unique.
While we should embrace those that can lead to more legitimate norms,
we need to rethink how we make such an assessment. Although legiti-
macy will always be a subjective conclusion, claims to legitimacy can be
objectively assessed. 10 law-making alliances require a new framework:
422. See, e.g., Barr & Miller, supra note 9, at 28-29 (explaining that public participation
improves rationality).
423. See, e.g., id. at 17 (citing the Basel Committee process as an example of process
begetting process).
424. Stewart, supra note 7, at 70 (discussing process-based criticism of international
regulation).
425. See, e.g., supra notes 232-237 and accompanying text (discussing the Integrated
Framework).
426. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 247, at 6-7 (noting that some actors attempt to
regime shift in order to enhance their own power).
427. Stewart, supra note 7, at 71-72 (explaining that the creation of transnational admin-
istrative law promotes transparency and accountability through compliance with due process
standards, thereby counteracting the injustices of regulatory decision-making that can disad-
vantage affected, yet politically weak, parties).
428. See, e.g., id. at 68.
429. Id. at 81.
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a process-based framework that examines the very relationship between
the organizations and inquires as to whether it indeed leads to more in-
clusiveness, more efficiency, or both. Good procedures help to ensure
that the relationship between the 1Os promotes legitimate functioning
and results. These alliances also impose costs. The costs include those
costs associated with an 10, but there are also unique costs as well.
These unique costs and concerns can be mitigated through process.
